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ESSAY 
 
TRADEMARK LAW AND THE PRICKLY AMBIVALENCE 
OF POST-PARODIES 
CHARLES E. COLMAN† 
This Essay examines what I call “post-parodies” in apparel. This emerging 
genre of do-it-yourself fashion is characterized by the appropriation and 
modification of third-party trademarks—not for the sake of dismissively mocking 
or zealously glorifying luxury fashion, but rather to engage in more complex 
forms of expression. I examine the cultural circumstances and psychological 
factors giving rise to post-parodic fashion, and conclude that the sensibility 
causing its proliferation is grounded in ambivalence.  
Unfortunately, current doctrine governing trademark “parodies” cannot 
begin to make sense of post-parodic goods; among other shortcomings, that 
doctrine suffers from crude analytical tools and a cramped view of “worthy” 
expression. I argue that trademark law—at least, if it hopes to determine 
post-parodies’ lawfulness in a meaning ful way—is asking the wrong questions, 
and that existing “parody” doctrine should be supplanted by a more thoughtful 
and nuanced framework. 
	  
 
† Acting Assistant Professor, New York University School of Law. I wish to thank New York 
University professors Barton Beebe, Michelle Branch, Nancy Deihl, and Bijal Shah, as well as Jake 
Hartman, Margaret Zhang, and the University of Pennsylvania Law Review Editorial Board for 
their assistance. This piece is dedicated to Anne Hollander (1930–2014), whose remarkable 
scholarship on dress should be required reading for just about everyone. 
8 Colman Final.docx (DO NOT DELETE)8/28/2014 3:07 PM 
12 University of Pennsylvania Law Review Online [Vol. 163: 11 
	
“[What most prevents us] from grasping what people are up to is not [so much] 
ignorance as to how cognition works . . . as a lack of familiarity with the imaginative 
universe within which their acts are signs.” 
–Clifford Geertz1 
“First Amendment protections do not apply only to those who speak clearly, whose 
jokes are funny, and whose parodies succeed.” 
–Judge Pierre N. Leval2 
I. THE RISE OF THE “POST-PARODY” 
A. An Unusual T-Shirt Catches My Eye 
While riding the New York City subway late last year, I noticed an 
unusual shirt: 
 
Figure 1: “Homiés South Central” 3 
 
1
 CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 13 (1973). 
2
 Yankee Publ’g Inc. v. News Am. Publ’g Inc., 809 F. Supp. 267, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). 
3 Brian Lichtenberg, Black Homies Tee with Gold Foil, BRIAN LICHTENBERG, http://www. 
shopbrianlichtenberg. com/black-homies-tee-with-gold-foil.html (last visited Aug. 18, 2014). 
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The shirt had obviously been designed to evoke the genteel horse-and-
buggy trademark of Hermès, the storied French fashion house: 
 
Figure 2: “Hermès Paris” Horse-and-Buggy Trademark4 
 
Less clear, however, was the message the shirt sought to convey. Perhaps 
its designer wished to highlight the stark difference between the moneyed, 
old-world fantasy of Hermès and the less glamorous reality of South 
Central Los Angeles—home to the troubled City of Compton5 and the 
birthplace of “gangsta rap.”6 Instead of a dapper groom beside a horse-and-
buggy, the individual depicted on the black and gold shirt stands beside 
what appears to be a broken-down truck. “Hermès” is displaced by “Homiés,” 
with the accent preserved (though flipped) to reinforce the reference. 
I went online to find out whether the “Homiés” shirt was in fact intended 
to express its designer’s “[a]nger at being poor, black, disenfranchised, 
abused, stereotyped, blamed, mistreated, [and] ignored.”7 No, it turned 
out—not at all. The man behind the shirt, Brian Lichtenberg, was not 
African-American, and he professed no particular political agenda, let alone 
 
4 William Stolerman, Hermes Ends Partnership with Wally, LUXURY INSIDER (Mar. 9, 2010), 
http://www.luxury-insider.com/luxury-news/2010/03/hermes-ends-partnership-with-wally. 
5 See Rory Carroll, Aja Brown, Compton’s New Mayor: ‘I See It as a New Brooklyn,’ THE 
GUARDIAN (Oct. 15, 2013, 11:38 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/15/aja-brown-
compton-new-mayor-sees-brooklyn (recounting how 1980s rap group N.W.A.’s double-platinum 
album Straight Outta Compton “captured the rage of an underclass trapped by urban decay, drugs, 
gang violence and despair” and “immortalised Compton, an impoverished sprawl south of Los 
Angeles, for all the wrong reasons”). Although Compton has changed substantially over the past 
thirty years, “many still consider [it] one of America’s murder capitals.” Id. 
6 “Gangsta rap” often contains “stories about crime, gunplay, raw sex and hatred for the 
police.” Jon Pareles, Music; Still Tough, Still Authentic. Still Relevant?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 1999), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/11/14/arts/music-still-tough-still-authentic-still-relevant.html. 
7 Claudia Calhoun, The Def Jam Generation, THE PALEY CENTER FOR MEDIA, http://www.
paleycenter.org/the-emergence-of-hip-hop (last visited Aug. 18, 2014). 
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one focused on race, poverty, or violence.8 His website stressed merchandising, 
not messaging; it peddled shoes,9 knitted caps,10 and various knick-knacks,11 
evoking not only Hermès, but numerous high-end fashion houses.12 
One of Lichtenberg’s other shirts made an ideological interpretation of 
the Homiés shirt seem even more far-fetched. That shirt began with the 
same visual motif, but went on to emphasize leisure and friendship. The 
words “South Central” were gone; in their place was the phrase “Rollin’ 
with the Homiés,” transforming the seemingly dilapidated truck into a 
buoyant joyride.13 
	  
 
8 See Brian Lichtenberg, Bio, BRIAN LICHTENBERG, http://brianlichtenberg.com/bio.html 
(last visited Aug. 18, 2014) (expressing Lichtenberg’s devotion to his “chic sensibility” and 
mentioning no specific social cause). 
9 Brian Lichtenberg, Homies Black – White Slip Ons (Mens), BRIAN LICHTENBERG, http: // 
 www.shopbrianlichtenberg.com/bltee/mens-shoes-footwear/homies-black-white-slip-ons-mens.
html (last visited Aug. 18, 2014). 
10 Brian Lichtenberg, Charcoal Homies Beanie with White Embroidery, BRIAN LICHTENBERG, 
http://www.shopbrianlichtenberg.com/best-sellers/charcoal-homies-beanie-with-white-embroidery. html 
(last visited Aug. 18, 2014). 
11 See, e.g., Brian Lichtenberg, Black Homies Graffiti Zipper Pouch with Gold Foil, BRIAN 
LICHTENBERG, http://www.shopbrianlichtenberg.com/new-arrivals/homies-graffiti-zipper-pouch.html 
(last visited Aug. 18, 2014). 
12  See generally Brian Lichtenberg, Best Sellers, BRIAN LICHTENBERG, http://
 www.shopbrianlichtenberg.com/best-sellers.html (last visited Aug. 18, 2014) (advertising “Homiés,” 
“Féline,” and “Ballin” merchandise). 
13 See generally Chris Martins, Hear J Dilla’s ‘Trucks,’ a Gangstafied Gary Numan Tribute, SPIN 
(Apr. 17, 2013, 11:06 AM), http://www.spin.com/articles/j-dilla-trucks-gary-numan-cars-vocal-
unreleased (“‘Trucks’ playfully turns the New Wave legend’s ‘Cars’ into a dedication to ‘big ass 
trucks with big ass rims.’”). 
8 Colman Final.docx (DO NOT DELETE)  8/28/2014 3:07 PM 
2014] TRADEMARK LAW AND POST-PARODIES 15 
Figure 3: “Rollin’ with the Homiés”14 
 
Any remaining possibility of a traditional “political agenda” on Lichtenberg’s 
part was dashed by the next shirt I encountered: a “muscle tee” designed to 
evoke the logo of the high-end French fashion house Céline. 
 
Figure 4: “Féline Meow”15 
 
14 Brian Lichtenberg, Black Rollin with the Homies Tee with Gold Foil, BRIAN LICHTENBERG, 
http://www.shopbrianlichtenberg.com/bltee/tees/black-rollin-with-the-homies-tee-with-gold-
foil.html (last visited Aug. 18, 2014). 
15  Brian Lichtenberg, White Feline Muscle Tee with Black Ink, BRIAN LICHTENBERG, 
http://www.shopbrianlichtenberg.com/white-feline-muscle-tee-with-black-ink.html (last visited 
Aug. 18, 2014). 
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Clearly, Lichtenberg’s main objective was not to create apparel that 
would empower the marginalized. Indeed, the designer’s biography took 
pains to emphasize that he was not on society’s margins, but rather in its 
spotlight.16 The bio went on to articulate Lichenberg’s creative ethos: 
Since the beginning, [Lichtenberg] has drawn inspiration from a host of 
creative friends, none of whom were ever slaves to fashion trends, but instead 
to genuine self-expression and creativity. [Based in Los Angeles rather than 
New York or Europe, Lichtenberg] has the luxury of operating “outside the 
box,” so to speak. It is from this place that Lichtenberg has had the freedom 
to take fashion into consideration without ever taking it too seriously. 
Tongue firmly planted in cheek, Lichtenberg’s designs are at the same time 
both reverential and autonomous.17 
Of course, poking fun at fashion—even by the rich and famous—is hardly 
a new trick. In Lichtenberg’s lifetime alone, we have giggled at the outrageous 
designers and models paraded through Zoolander18 and snickered at the 
haughty fashion editors skewered by The Devil Wears Prada.19 Long before 
Lichtenberg, nineteenth-century writer Thomas Carlyle amused readers 
with his description of the so-called “dandy,” “a witness and living Martyr 
to the eternal worth of Clothes.”20 Before that, there was James Gillray, 
whose late eighteenth-century comedic etchings delighted the public by 
mocking “the follies of contemporary fashion.”21 And over four centuries 
ago, playwright John Vanbrugh had theatergoers rolling in the aisles at the 
antics of “Lord Foppington,” a character who at one point interrupts a 
swordfight to compliment his opponent’s cuffs.22 
Still, something distinguished Lichtenberg’s work from the satire 
preceding it; his apparel was more than an easy laugh at fashion’s expense. 
The simultaneously “reverential and autonomous” character of his products 
had a subtler flavor—a more complex relationship with fashion—that 
warranted further investigation. To better understand what Lichtenberg 
 
16 See Brian Lichtenberg, supra note 8 (claiming that “the California native has been the go-to 
designer for the music industry’s biggest pop stars for over a decade”). 
17 Id. 
18 ZOOLANDER (Paramount Pictures 2001). 
19 THE DEVIL WEARS PRADA (Fox 2000 Pictures 2006). 
20 Thomas Carlyle, The Dandiacal Body, in THE RISE OF FASHION: A READER 166, 166 
(Daniel Leonhard Purdy ed., 2004). 
21 Christopher Breward, THE CULTURE OF FASHION 111 (1995). 
22 See Matt Wolf, Review: ‘The Relapse,’ VARIETY (July 27, 2001, 2:01 PM), http:// variety.
com/2001/legit/reviews/the-relapse-1200468966 (describing Lord Foppington’s character as “a 
periwigged Elton John gone gloriously over the top, and beyond”). 
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was up to, I needed context; I thus turned to Google to locate other apparel 
displaying Lichtenberg’s sensibility.  
It took no more than a few searches to discover that such goods were 
plentiful. To be sure, many of the shirts, hats, and other items I came across 
were thinly veiled knockoffs, putting a slight twist on high-end fashion 
trademarks to make a quick buck. But other works, like Lichtenberg’s, were 
more creative, borrowing the imagery of luxury fashion and manipulating it in 
clever ways that could not be reduced to profit-driven “free-riding” on 
another’s prestige. 
Limiting my examination to goods that transcended “knockoff ” status, I 
chose a cross-section of Lichtenberg-esque works and tentatively classified 
them based on apparent ease of interpretation. In a few instances (where 
the visual material consisted mostly of words), I was reasonably confident 
that I understood what the shirt was trying to “say”: 
 
Figure 5: “Dior Not War”23 
 
	  
 
23 Dior Not War Crew Neck, WHO CARES NYC, http:// www.whocaresnyc.com/products/
dior-not-war-crew-neck (last visited Aug. 18, 2014). 
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Figure 6: “Poor”24 
 
	  
 
24 See Poor, ETSY, https://img0.etsystatic.com/031/0/7795656/il_340x270.563406452_r6vv.jpg 
(last visited Aug. 18, 2014). 
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Figure 7: “Envy”25 
 
	  
 
25 Melanie Andujar, Envy Parody Design Inspired by Fendi, REDBUBBLE, http:// www. redbubble.
com/people/melanieandujar/works/10805228-envy-parody-design-inspired-by-fendi? p=t-shirt (last 
visited Aug. 18, 2014). This t-shirt evokes the primary logo of the Italian luxury fashion house Fendi: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For one commentator’s view that the public perceives Fendi as “the leading brand for high-quality 
products that are stylish, durable, lavish and eye-catching,” see Morgan King, Fendi: The Definition 
of Luxury, VISION ARTISTRY MAGAZINE (May 30, 2011), http://visionaryartistrymag.com/ 2011/
05/fendi-the-definition-of-luxury/. 
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Figure 8: “LW Label Whore”26 
 
Other works in my sample did not lend themselves to a single obvious 
interpretation (though outside sources might shed light on the context or 
purpose of these items)27:  
 
26 Dentzdesigndeals, Label Whore – Louis Vuitton Parody – Black Tshirt – Women and Mens Clothing, 
WANELO, http://wanelo.com/p/2780238/label-whore-louis-vuitton-parody-black-tshirt-women-
and- mens-clothing (last visited Aug. 18, 2014).This t-shirt evokes the logo of the well-known 
fashion house Louis Vuitton: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
File: Louis Vuitton Logo, WIKIMEDIA COMMONS (Mar. 6, 2011), http:// commons.wikimedia.org/
wiki/File:Louis_Vuitton_Logo.svg. 
27 My research revealed, for example, that the shirt in Figure 9 was inspired by the work of 
street artist Christophe Schwarz, or “Zevs,” whose “dripping” technique originated in his 
campaign to metaphorically bloody fashion billboards. As a result, “the viewer is forced to 
consider the image in an entirely different way.” Erin Wooters, Street Artist Zevs Detained in Hong 
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Figure 9: Dripping Chanel Logo28 
	  
 
Kong for Defacing Chanel Logo – Interview, ART RADAR ASIA ( July 29, 2009), http:// artradarjournal. 
com/2009/07/29/street-artist-zevs-detained-in-hong-kong-for-defacing-chanel-logo-interview. 
Zevs explains that he “kept working with the dripping effect throughout [his post-billboard] work 
because it conveys multiple meanings, and visually shows stark contrast and beautiful pattern and 
texture.” Id. 
Figure 11 is the work of a popular designer, Mike Frederiqo, whose website sheds some light 
on his artistic objectives. See About Mike Frederiqo, MIKE FREDERIQO, http://www.mikefrederiqo.
com/about-mike-frederiqo (last visited Aug. 18, 2014) (noting the artist’s prior work as a tattoo and 
graffiti artist, Andy Warhol’s influence on Frederiqo’s art, and the “acclaim” that Frederiqo has 
received for his “redesigned brand logos featuring founders, creative directors and designers 
imbued within their logo”).  
The design depicted in Figure 10 apparently seeks to participate in a dialogue surrounding 
Lichtenberg’s Homiés shirt; of course, without knowledge of the Lichtenberg shirt (and numerous 
derivatives thereof appearing across on the Internet), one cannot properly interpret this new variant. 
28 Zevs, Chanel T-Shirt, DE BUCK GALLERY, http://shop.debuckgallery.com/zevs/353-zevs-
chanel-t-shirt.html (last visited Aug 18, 2014). The “drip” design, which can now be found in 
countless variations across the Internet, modifies the well-known “interlocking ‘C’s’” imagery of the 
fashion house Chanel: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
File: Chanel Logo Interlocking Cs, WIKIPEDIA (Apr. 14, 2012, 4:27 AM), http:// en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/File:Chanel_logo_interlocking_cs.svg. 
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Figure 10: “Hatèrs Gonna Hate”29 
 
Figure 11: “Tribute to Mrs. Vuitton”30 
 
	  
 
29 Haters Gonna Hate (Gold Hermes Parody), HUMAN, http://www.lookhuman.com/design/
34379-haters-gonna-hate-gold-hermes-parody (last visited Aug. 18, 2014). 
30 Mike Frederiqo, Tribute to Mrs. Vuitton, MIKE FREDERIQO, http://www.mikefrederiqo.com/
tshirts/tribute-to-mrs-vuitton.html (last visited Aug. 18, 2014). 
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Still other products, like the Homiés shirt whose ambiguity had first 
piqued my curiosity, could potentially be read in a certain way, but at the 
now-obvious risk of substituting one’s own assumptions and biases for the 
creators’ intentions: 
 
Figure 12: “Lord Voldemort”31 
 
	  
 
31 Lord Voldemort, HUMAN, http://www.lookhuman.com/design/10579-lord-voldemort?gclid=
CODRpMjSn8ACFc1i7AodfFcARQ (last visited Aug. 19, 2014). 
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Figure 13: “N° 1 Cares at All”32 
 
	  
 
32 No 1 Cares, IMNOTADESIGNER.COM, http://imnotadesigner.com/inadshop/index.php?
route=product/product&path=65&product_id=187&sort=p.price&order=ASC (last visited Aug. 
18, 2014). This shirt draws on the imagery of Chanel’s well-known “No. 5” fragrance: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHANEL, N°5 Eau de Parfum Spray, http://www.chanel.com/en_US/fragrance-beauty/Fragrance-
N%C2%B05-N%C2%B05-88181/sku/88184 (last visited Aug. 18, 2014). 
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Figure 14: “LV” with Peace Sign33 
 
Figure 15: “Class Cred”34 
 
	  
 
33 LV Love Victory Peace T-Shirt, GLAMZELLE, http://www.glamzelle.com/products/lv-love-
victory-peace-t-shirt-2-colors-available (last visited Aug. 18, 2014). 
34  Annakatee, Kill Brand Class Cred White Oversize Scoop Neck Tee Shirt, KABOODLE, 
http://www.kaboodle.com/reviews/kill-brand-class-cred-white-oversize-scoop-neck-tee-shirt (last visited 
Aug. 18, 2014). 
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Despite differences in the legibility of these items, they seemed to share a 
particular sensibility: like Lichtenberg’s designs, each work appeared to 
acknowledge the prestige (or at least the prominent social role) of high-end 
fashion, while simultaneously using the imagery of luxury for the creator’s 
own artistic ends. These works did not engage in a straightforward, unwavering 
critique of high-end fashion—indeed, some of the shirts seemed to express a 
desire for luxury goods—yet they declined to treat the iconic imagery of 
venerable fashion houses as inviolable. Even if luxury items purveyed by 
the brands in question might be out of financial reach, that fact apparently 
provided no cause for protest in the traditional sense.35 Rather, these works 
uniformly expressed attitudes toward, and relationships with, luxury brands 
that were far more nuanced than pure loyalty or opposition. 
As a result, placing the works in a particular genre proved difficult. The 
goods could not accurately be described as “parodies”—at least, not as that 
term is used in intellectual-property law.36 Their apparently personal and 
sincere nature meant that they could not be characterized as blank “pastiche.”37 
If one were forced to place each item somewhere on a sort of “communicative 
spectrum” between empty appropriation of imagery (pastiche) and carefully 
targeted, humorous critique (parody), most of these works fell a considerable 
distance from each pole.38 Further complicating matters, the ambiguity of 
the expression contained in these fashion goods lay in stark contrast to the 
 
35 See, e.g., supra figs.6, 7. 
36 The definition of “parody” used in trademark law, discussed at length below, is far narrower 
than most traditional definitions of the term, which have included styles and techniques “found in 
all kinds of generic contexts and not just in those that are traditionally satiric.” Robert Chambers, 
Parody: The Art that Plays with Art, in 21 STUDIES IN LITERARY CRITICISM AND THEORY 195, 
199 (Hans H. Rudnick ed., 2010). 
37 See FREDRIC JAMESON, POSTMODERNISM, OR, THE CULTURAL LOGIC OF LATE 
CAPITALISM 17 (1991) (“Pastiche is, like parody, the imitation of a peculiar or unique, idiosyncratic 
style, the wearing of a linguistic mask, speech in a dead language. But it is a neutral practice of 
such mimicry, without any of parody’s ulterior motives, amputated of the satiric impulse, devoid 
of laughter and of any conviction that alongside the normal tongue you have momentarily 
borrowed, some healthy linguistic normality still exists. Pastiche is thus blank parody . . . .”). For 
several examples of what might be considered “trademark pastiche” in fashion, see Jon Caramanica, 
The Return of Logo Culture, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/21/fashion/
the-return-of-logo-culture-in-fashion.html. 
38 While some of the works could arguably be characterized as “collage,” that description was 
inappropriate for many of them. Further, the meaning of “collage” and its proper treatment under 
the law have been debated so extensively in literary, artistic, and legal circles that trying to apply 
that definition here would more likely obscure rather than clarify the issue at hand. See generally 
Pierre Joris, On the Seamlessly Nomadic Future of Collage, in CUTTING ACROSS MEDIA: 
APPROPRIATION ART, INTERVENTIONIST COLLAGE, AND COPYRIGHT LAW 185, 185-86 
(Kembrew McLeod & Rudolf Kuenzli eds., 2011).  
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output of both the mainstream fashion industry and its fiercest detractors 
over the past half-century. In order to appreciate exactly how these works 
are new, and why they are proliferating at this particular moment, one must 
learn a bit about recent fashion history. 
B. An Aggressively Abridged History of the Past Half-Century of Fashion  
(with Some Theory, for Good Measure) 
One would think it obvious that, in order to make pronouncements 
about a given cultural phenomenon, one must first understand what that 
phenomenon is. Yet when academic commentators have written about 
fashion at all, they have most often done so without making any serious 
effort to comprehend the subject matter at hand.39 Those who carefully 
examine fashion, by contrast, typically realize in short order that it is a 
“profound and critical . . . part of the social life of man . . . .”40 As René 
König has explained, “fashion is not merely a superficial—decorative or 
disfiguring—feature of life,” but rather “an important regulator and means 
of expression within [every] community.”41 Cultural studies scholar Elizabeth 
Wilson more recently elaborated: “fashionable dress [in Western cultures] is 
socially central, a symbolic system of crucial importance [in which] garments 
as objects, so close to our bodies, also articulate the soul.”42 
Such multidimensional accounts of fashion are almost entirely absent 
from (the decidedly sparse) legal scholarship and (the more voluminous, but 
often dismissive) case law on the subject in the United States.43 The prevailing 
theory of fashion in both spheres, to the extent the cultural phenomenon is 
 
39 See Tom Wolfe, Introduction to RENÉ KÖNIG, A LA MODE: ON THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 
OF FASHION 15, 17 (F. Bradley trans., Seabury Press 1973) (1971) (noting that most academics 
have treated fashion as nothing more than “the embroidery of history, if that”). Wolfe goes on to 
explain that even “novelists who have dwelled on fashion in [a serious] way have usually been 
regarded in their own time as lightweights—‘trivial’ has been the going word . . . . [This derision 
has even afflicted] those who eventually have been judged to be literary giants of their eras.” Id. at 
19. The basis for this dismissive attitude is suspect. As I have explained elsewhere, the word 
“frivolous” has often appeared in judicial discussions of “fashion”—where the matter under 
discussion was “ornamental” material geared primarily toward women—but has not been used 
where more “utilitarian” apparel was concerned. See Charles Colman, ‘A Female Thing’: On Fashion, 
Sexism, and the United States Federal Judiciary, 4 VESTOJ 53, 57-58 (2013) (noting how “some judges 
continue[] to treat clothing-related cases as unworthy of their time”). 
40 Wolfe, supra note 39, at 17. 
41 Id. 
42 ELIZABETH WILSON, ADORNED IN DREAMS: FASHION AND MODERNITY xiii (rev. 
ed. 2013); accord FRED DAVIS, FASHION, CULTURE, AND IDENTITY 18 (1992) (“Fashion 
manages through symbolic means to resonate exquisitely with the shifting, highly self-referential 
collective tensions and moods abroad in the land.”).  
43 See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
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theorized at all, has remained largely faithful to a century-old economic 
account of fashion as just another form of “conspicuous consumption.” That 
analysis, typically attributed to Thorstein Veblen,44 reduces fashion to (as 
paraphrased by cultural theorist Paul Sweetman) “a specifically modern 
phenomenon that acts to express or maintain distinctions between different 
social groups in a situation where rigid and inflexible social hierarchies no 
longer apply.”45 
Veblen’s account of fashion is appealingly orderly and seemingly intuitive; 
its success is understandable. However, the empirical shortcomings of his 
theory have been apparent for decades, and it is now beyond dispute that 
Veblen’s “‘top down’ approach to the fashion process” is out of date, 
incomplete, or simply wrong.46 As Sweetman explains: “while [Veblen’s 
approach] may have accurately reflected the workings of the fashion process 
up to the 1950s or 1960s, such a model is no longer appropriate given the 
declining influence of haute couture—and the ensuing rise of ‘street-style’—
since around that period.”47 
 
44 See generally THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS (Dover 
Publ’ns 1994) (1899). 
45 Paul Sweetman, Shop-Window Dummies? Fashion, the Body, and Emergent Socialities, in BODY 
DRESSING 59, 61 (Joanne Entwistle & Elizabeth Wilson eds., 2001). 
46 Id. at 62 (“Whilst widely influential, the perspective [most often attributed to Thorstein 
Veblen, as articulated in his 1899 book The Theory of the Leisure Class has been] roundly criticized 
[for, among other things,] its failure to account for or address either the form that fashion takes or 
its links to wider social, cultural, and artistic movements.” (internal citation omitted)). 
Consider one commentator’s elaboration on the problematic unidimensionality of Veblen’s theory: 
Since Thorstein Veblen’s 1899 Theory of the Leisure Class, the idea of conspicuous 
consumption has dominated historical and sociological analyses of consumer behavior, 
and is now a part of our everyday vocabulary. Veblenite theories of consumer behavior 
argue that fashion changes are motivated by social emulation, conspicuous consumption, 
and invidious distinction—“the stimulus of an invidious comparison which prompts 
us to outdo those with whom we are in the habit of classing ourselves.” [But] men’s 
fashion changes from the late seventeenth century to the mid-nineteenth century 
were driven by an increasingly inconspicuous form of consumption, a form of 
consumption—equally invidious, to be sure—that balanced class demands for social 
distinction with a gender ideology of masculine renunciation. Conspicuous 
consumption is merely one social dynamic that motivates fashion change: understanding 
the variety of systems of consumer behavior means identifying how social and gender 
groups at different historical moments used consumer objects in a number of ways to 
define themselves in the midst of political, economic, and social change. 
DAVID KUCHTA, THE THREE-PIECE SUIT AND MODERN MASCULINITY: ENGLAND, 1550–
1850 5 (2002) (footnotes omitted). 
47 Sweetman, supra note 45, at 62 (internal citation omitted). On rare occasions, legal scholars 
have addressed the flaws of Veblen’s approach. See, e.g., Barton Beebe, Intellectual Property Law and 
the Sumptuary Code, 123 HARV. L. REV. 809, 822 (2010) (noting that while Veblen’s “‘trickle-
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Indeed, starting in the mid-twentieth century, the “development of 
modern fashion opened up an important new space for the liberating 
presentation of the private self.”48 American consumers became increasingly 
aware that fashion “had the power to create political change” through its 
function as “a code, a symbolic vocabulary that offers a sub-rational but 
instant and very brilliant illumination of the character of individuals and 
even entire periods, especially periods of great turmoil.”49 This power was 
readily evident to those whose ideologies and/or ethnicities played a central 
role in identity formation. The hippies, for example, “adopted a naturalistic, 
flowing style, apparently in total opposition to the mainstream styles,” 
which “originated in the student counter-culture and student campus 
rebellions of the anti-Vietnam war 1960s.”50 
Similarly, many African Americans found that they accrued “opposi-
tional economy” by choosing traditional hairstyles like dreadlocks and the 
Afro; this use of fashion expressed a distinct identity, one’s relationship to 
history, and one’s political ideology. Hair was far more than a mere status 
symbol or decorative medium; rather, the consciously selected styles were 
“cultivated and politically constructed in a particular historical moment as 
part of a strategic contestation of white dominance and the cultural power 
of whiteness.”51 
In other words, by the late 1960s, the “top down” model of fashion posited 
by Veblen no longer told the whole story (if it continued to tell an accurate 
story at all). Suddenly, fashion was “evolving on the street without the 
direction of—and often in opposition to—the editors and high-fashion 
designers.”52 But this honeymoon period would not last long. The high-end 
fashion industry—and mainstream fashion, more generally—rapidly developed 
techniques to remain relevant and profitable in the new cultural landscape. 
The do-or-die moment for luxury fashion arguably occurred in 1966, 
when designer Yves Saint Laurent (previously at the helm of Christian 
 
down’ theory of the fashion process may greatly aid quantitative analysis, it has, as an empirical 
matter, long been discredited” due to its failure to “offer a comprehensive explanation of the 
modern global fashion process”); see also KAL RAUSTIALA & CHRISTOPHER SPRIGMAN, THE 
KNOCKOFF ECONOMY 39 (2012) (accepting Veblen’s “conspicuous consumption” theory as a 
core feature of fashion but supplementing Veblen’s account to some degree). Compare Jeremy N. 
Sheff, Veblen Brands, 96 MINN. L. REV. 769, 774-75 (2012) (accepting Veblen’s theory as a basic 
premise but arguing against judicial adoption of such reasoning in certain trademark disputes). 
48 CHRISTOPHER BREWARD, FASHION 161 (2003). 
49 Wolfe, supra note 39, at 17, 19. 
50 WILSON, supra note 42, at 192-93. 
51 Kobena Mercer, Black Hair/Style Politics, 1987 NEW FORMATIONS 33, 40 (emphasis omitted). 
52 KARL ASPELUND, FASHIONING SOCIETY: A HUNDRED YEARS OF HAUTE COUTURE BY 
SIX DESIGNERS 162 (2009). 
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Dior) took the unprecedented step “of bringing the radical youth styles 
[that] had begun to appear[] into haute couture.”53 Saint Laurent’s brilliant, 
if cynical, strategy was to sell expensive clothing inspired by youth, subcultural, 
and countercultural styles to moneyed consumers who were in no way 
affiliated with the groups that had originated those styles.54 
Saint Laurent’s appropriation of oppositional styles for wealthy clientele 
represented the apparent birth of “[t]he marketing of image, divorced from 
its [ideological or subcultural] origin, that we have become so used to in 
fashion since the 1960s.”55 Just a few short years after the average American 
consumer had discovered fashion’s political potency, the mainstream 
fashion industry had already begun to strip the visual medium of its 
“oppositional economy.”56  Dress historian Karl Aspelund explains the 
long-term effect of this corporate jiu-jitsu on countercultural and otherwise 
“subversive” fashion: 
Counterculture cannot survive being picked up by media and marketing 
campaigns, and even if it does survive in some form, the media creation 
becomes the perceived reality. The media creation stands in for the original, 
another creature that lives on as a simulacrum even after the original is 
gone. . . . The universalization of television, as [Jack] Kerouac observed, is 
right at the heart of [the] lack of subversiveness in modern-day fashion. If 
the image is everywhere, then how can it be nonconformist or revolutionary?57 
Indeed, fast-forward twenty-five years, and “antifashion” had practically 
evaporated; fashion was by and large apolitical.58 As Fred Davis observed in 
1992, “[a]mid today’s cacophony of acceptable fashions, it is difficult to 
register a riveting antifashion message. What is being opposed?”59 
By the turn of the twenty-first century, American society “offer[ed] a 
scenario in which the carefully manipulated associations of the fashionable 
brand and a keen attention to the vagaries of style [had] transformed the 
humble equipment of contemporary living into the ephemeral props of 
 
53 Id. at 161. 
54 See id. at 166 (noting how this strategy created a “total separation of image from meaning”). 
55 Id. 
56 Perhaps surprisingly, this occurred not just with apparel, but with African American hairstyles 
as well. See Mercer, supra note 51, at 41 (“Once commercialized in the market-place the Afro lost 
its specific signification as a ‘black’ cultural-political statement. Cut off from its original political 
contexts, it became just another fashion: with an Afro wig anyone could wear the style.”). 
57 ASPELUND, supra note 52, at 167. 
58 See ANNE HOLLANDER, SEX AND SUITS 29 (1994). 
59 DAVIS, supra note 42, at 187. 
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ever-changing lifestyle concepts.”60 The infusion of material objects with 
psychological and sociological significance was not, of course, a novel means 
of selling goods,61 but the new engineers of image manipulation managed to 
perfect the technique by painstakingly studying and harnessing the “mystification” 
of objects to achieve maximum profits.62 
The most prominent engineers of this manipulation were multinational 
luxury conglomerates like LVMH Moët Hennessy Louis Vuitton SA 
(LVMH), Kering (formerly “PPR”), and Richemont. As LVMH chairman 
Bernard Arnault has explained, his business model for fashion was not about 
fulfilling consumers’ own preexisting desires, but rather about creating a 
“fantasy” in which consumers could then participate by buying an outfit, a 
handbag, a bottle of perfume, or just a tube of lipstick—objects at various 
price points that made famed brands available, in some form, to most 
consumers in the developed world.63 Arnault’s mission was hardly philanthropic, 
of course; his business strategy, eerily reminiscent of 1970s neo-Marxist 
commentary on the modern “consumerist society,”64 deliberately coupled this 
“fantasy” with social anxiety. As Arnault once candidly acknowledged, “[y]ou 
feel as if you must buy [the latest ‘must-have’ item] . . . or else you won’t be 
in the moment. You will be left behind.”65 
Inspiring such anxiety would require guile. Developments in technology, 
outsourcing, and other industrial innovations during the twentieth century 
had led to the widespread availability of high-quality apparel and cosmetics. 
As a result, something besides quality, something besides style—something 
that could not easily be reproduced by others at a lower price66—would have 
 
60 Christopher Breward, Fashion, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE HISTORY OF 
CONSUMPTION 3 (Frank Trentmann ed., 2012), available at Oxford Handbooks Online, 
http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com. 
61 Sociologist Richard Sennett’s description of the turn of the twentieth century seemed equally 
applicable 100 years later: “Even as they became more uniform, physical goods were endowed in 
advertising with human qualities, made to seem tantalizing mysteries which had to be possessed to 
be understood.” RICHARD SENNETT, THE FALL OF PUBLIC MAN 20 (W.W. Norton & Co. 
1992) (1974). 
62 Id.; see also DANA THOMAS, DELUXE: HOW LUXURY LOST ITS LUSTER 41-42 (2007) 
(describing how modern-day fashion focuses chiefly on what products represent). 
63 THOMAS, supra note 62, at 41-42, 54-55. 
64 See, e.g., JOHN BERGER, WAYS OF SEEING 143 (1974) (arguing that mainstream advertisements 
convey that the “power to spend money is the power to live” and that “those who lack the power 
to spend money [will] become literally faceless”). 
65 THOMAS, supra note 62, at 41-42. 
66 See generally Charles E. Colman, An Overview of Intellectual Property Issues Relevant to the 
Fashion Industry, in NAVIGATING FASHION LAW: LEADING LAWYERS ON EXPLORING THE 
TRENDS, CASES, AND STRATEGIES OF FASHION LAW *52 (2012), available at 2012 WL 167352. 
Economic and legal realities in the United States contribute to this result: 
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to be fetishized if consumers were to be made to worry about being “left 
behind.” The seemingly perfect candidate for the job was the “logo.” 
A newfound emphasis on logos appeared sensible from both legal and 
economic perspectives. The law, especially in the United States, tended to 
provide more robust enforcement tools to registrants of trademarks than it 
did to creators of original designs. Just as importantly, logos could be 
prominently placed on (or all over) a heavily used and relatively affordable 
component of the fashion ensemble: the handbag.67 Fashion houses adopting 
Arnault’s business model would, of course, continue to design apparel and 
put on spectacular fashion shows, but mainly to “garner headlines and dress 
up ads to sell leather goods.”68 This attention enabled companies to push 
handbags—associated with the magic of haute couture, if not truly part of 
it—“to the forefront of their offerings.”69 Major fashion houses thereby “shifted 
the focus [back, arguably] from what the product is to what it represents.”70 
Yet this heavy reliance on the logo was (and is) not without its vulnera-
bilities. To the extent that luxury goods consist primarily of logos evoking 
the recycled imagery of largely indistinguishable marketing campaigns,71 
they end up providing consumers with very little of the “fantasy” that 
makes fashion appealing in the first place.72 As Jean Baudrillard explains, 
 
Trademark protection is especially important in the [U.S.] fashion industry, because 
most of the products sold by that industry are not independently protectable under 
the copyright and patent regimes . . . . In the absence of copyright or patent protection, 
it is generally the case that anyone can duplicate a particular accessory or item of apparel. 
What makes this purse or that jacket valuable, then, is often the source of the good rather 
than its intrinsic value. 
Id. at *25. 
67 See THOMAS, supra note 62, at 167-71 (“Handbags are the engine that drives luxury brands today.”). 
68 Id. at 51. 
69 Id. at 169. 
70 Id. at 41, 169. Some estimate that Louis Vuitton makes only five percent of its revenue 
from apparel. Id. at 51. 
71
 See Vanessa Friedman, In Fashion Ads, Plenty of Déjà Vu, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2014), http://
www.nytimes.com/ 2014/08/07/fashion/cara-delevingne-gisele-bundchen-and-edie-campbell-are-
familiar-faces-in-fall-fashion-ads.html?_r=0 (“For an industry that pays a lot of lip service to 
originality and unique points of view, fashion can seem surprisingly lemminglike at times.”). 
72 Anne Hollander aptly describes this power of fashion: 
Western fashion offers a visual way out of the trap of tradition, the prison of unquestioning 
wisdom. Fashion allows clothing to create an image of skepticism, of comic possibil-
ity, of different powers and alternative thoughts, of manifold chances, of escape from 
fixed meanings and fixed roles. Thus, modern fashion has consistently looked wonder-
ful from a distance, especially to young people seeking change from old ways. 
HOLLANDER, supra note 58, at 19-20. 
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this scenario presents the consumer “with a mythology at one remove, 
which strives to pass off as fantasy what is merely fantasmagoria, to entrap 
individuals by way of a rigged symbolics, with the myth of their individual 
unconscious, to make them invest it as a consumer function.”73 
A great number of American consumers have at one time or another 
bought into the “rigged symbolics” of the logo, for the post-antifashion 
landscape long presented few readily accessible, semiotically rich alterna-
tives to mainstream fashion’s prepackaged “fantasy.” 74  In recent years, 
however, many individual consumers have come to understand—or have 
recaptured a lost understanding of—“the power of fashion . . . to transform 
the sense of self in far-reaching ways.”75 
In the 1960s, fashion’s “communicative role in the production of identities” 
was largely the province of discrete ideological and ethnic minority 
groups.76 Over the past decade, however, technological advances in “do-it-
yourself ” (DIY) apparel production, increasingly sophisticated web-based 
platforms for consumer interaction, and myriad avenues for small-scale 
distribution have made self-fashioning tools available to the quintessentially 
modern “group of one.” This new, personalized cornucopia of wearable 
items, whether created by others or designed and produced on one’s own, 
offers, by its very nature, far richer possibilities for self-expression, identity 
formation, and “fantasy” than fashion conglomerates can realistically provide. 
To be sure, some consumers continue to “produce” or “transform” their 
identities primarily through the “symbolics” of fashion logos. Others appear 
to remain comfortable with some participation in the mainstream fashion 
system, while avoiding the potentially exhibitionist and corporate character 
of the logo.77 A third group, it seems, has decided that the luxury fashion 
system, while purporting to offer objects that facilitate personal expression 
 
73 JEAN BAUDRILLARD, THE CONSUMER SOCIETY: MYTHS AND STRUCTURES 147 
(Chris Turner trans., 1998) (1970). 
74 Further, as noted above, this prepackaged “luxury” was available to a greater percentage of 
the population, at a lower price, than it had ever been. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
75 Breward, supra note 60, at 1. 
76 Ruth Holliday, Fashioning the Queer Self, in BODY DRESSING 215, 217 (Joanne Entwistle & 
Elizabeth Wilson eds., 2001). 
77 This second group of consumers has reportedly abandoned prominent logos in favor of 
more subtle identity indicators. Suleman Anaya, Has Logo Fatigue Reached a Tipping Point?, 
BUSINESS OF FASHION (Mar. 11, 2013), http://www.businessoffashion.com/2013/03/has-logo-fatigue-
reached-a-tipping-point.html (“[L]ogo fatigue [has grown] pervasive enough in the West to power 
the rise of ‘stealth luxury’ brands like Bottega Veneta, which, over the last decade, grew from a 
small, family-run enterprise to a global powerhouse driving over $1 billion-plus sales.”). For a 
critique of the legal strategies Bottega Veneta has used in support of this business model, see 
Charles Colman, The TTAB’s Dangerous Dismissal of ‘Doubt,’ HARV. J.L. & TECH. DIG. (Nov. 12, 
2013), http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/trademark/the-ttabs-dangerous-dismissal-of-doubt. 
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and fulfill fantasies, can never truly “awaken anything ‘deep within us’”—
not only because goods bearing that system’s brands “don’t offend against 
anything” (true since the fall of antifashion), but also because the “metalanguage 
of connotations” offered by such fashion is simply inadequate to express the 
breadth of human emotions and identities.78  
C. Today’s “Consumer-Creator”: Neither Unwavering  
Acolyte nor Vocal Dissident 
Fortunately for this third group of consumers, defined by a desire for 
diverse means of visual self-expression outside of the mainstream fashion 
system, the technological and other innovations mentioned above provide 
an increasingly viable “opt-out” mechanism.79 It is crucial to recognize that 
this development represents a fundamental change in the fashion producer–
consumer relationship; mutual dependence is no longer a given. This uncou-
pling coincides with the rise of the consumer-creator, who uses these newly 
available tools to realize his own vision of fashion by creating works that 
“speak” to him—and, when worn or otherwise displayed, “speak” to others on 
his behalf.80 
 
78 BAUDRILLARD, supra note 73, at 148. Naturally, there is overlap and movement among 
these groups; further, I do not claim that such categories are exhaustive, even among the general 
population or subpopulations within the United States. Rather, I employ this three-tiered 
framework mainly as a heuristic for conceptualizing the broad, if piecemeal, cultural migration 
toward the “consumer-creator” role discussed in Section I.C—a role that ultimately yields the 
fashion items under discussion.  
79 Indeed, these technologies are evolving at a pace that excites the public and alarms corporate 
America. Nearly every week, it seems, a different law firm posts a bulletin about the surprisingly 
rapid development of “3D printing” and other DIY technologies—and it would be naïve to think 
corporate concerns relate only to counterfeiting. See, e.g., Hayden Delaney, Game of Thrones, 3D 
Printers & Copyright, LEXOLOGY (Dec. 24, 2013), http://www.lexology.com/ library/detail.aspx?g=
3a000339-c453-405d-8d13-f7e2d21fc960 (discussing the “perfect storm of cheaper 3D printing 
devices which are becoming increasingly available to end consumers [who are] finding innovative 
ways to put these devices to . . . use,” and noting that corporations might have to “look at other 
legal doctrines to afford [the desired level of] protection where copyright simply won’t provide”); 
Seyfarth Shaw LLP, 3D Printing and Intellectual Property, LEXOLOGY (Jan. 21, 2013), http://www.
lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=117494c2-aa4a-40f6-8b19-96db41724cfb (noting that as “[p]rinters 
become faster and more reliable, layers of construction become smaller, allowing for more 
sophisticated products, [and] the scope of prime materials continues to grow,” we start to “see the 
first signs of IP holders trying to levy their usual tax on innovation into a new field”). 
80 While the consumer-creator often makes his products available for sale to others, this does 
not—as a matter of common sense or established doctrine—render them less “expressive.” See 
generally Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 906 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that even 
if a parody had a commercial purpose, that alone was not enough to make the parody “commercial” 
where the commercial purpose was “inextricably entwined with . . . expressive elements” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 574 (1994) 
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It makes little sense to call this DIY fashion “countercultural,” or even 
“oppositional,” for—as we have seen in the representative examples depicted 
above—its creators do not design these objects for political protest. When 
one can quite literally, and quite affordably, create a unique article of 
clothing for every day of the week, proclaiming oneself a staunch adversary 
of the fashion “establishment” seems childish, heavy-handed—for that 
“establishment” is not (at the moment) the enemy, but just another service 
provider, 81  another component of one’s everyday aesthetic experience. 
Today, a given consumer might have an attitude toward high-end fashion 
ranging anywhere from strong distaste to relative indifference to unwavering 
adulation, but far more nuanced attitudes toward fashion are possible—and, 
one imagines, quite likely.  
All of this brings us back to Brian Lichtenberg, the creator of the Homiés 
t-shirt, and his fellow consumer-creators whose works appear above. These 
designers use the trademarks and other marketing imagery of high-end 
fashion houses in their own works for expressive ends—even if their 
expression is not necessarily “legible” to others.82 But while a specific 
message (if it makes sense to speak of one at all) might be difficult to discern, 
these DIY goods’ design and production indisputably create a means for 
individuals to exercise agency by taking the “carefully manipulated”83 brand 
imagery of aspiring corporate tastemakers and manipulating it once again to 
visually convey one’s idiosyncratic feelings about luxury and/or fashion. 
 
(rejecting the Sixth Circuit’s view that a “commercial” purpose renders a parody or other work 
“presumptively unfair” in fair-use analysis). Non-creator consumers will naturally gravitate toward 
products from consumer-creators with similar sensibilities. In this Essay, I do not dwell on this 
distinction; instead, I focus mainly on the creator-consumers, because (1) they are the most likely 
targets of lawsuits brought by trademark owners, (2) it is their direct creativity and expression at 
issue in such lawsuits, and (3) an examination of non-creator consumers’ motivations for buying and 
wearing the items in question would present interpretive difficulties surpassing even those relating 
to the creator-consumer. See COLIN CAMPBELL, The Meaning of Objects and the Meaning of Actions, 
1 JOURNAL OF MATERIAL CULTURE 93, 95 (1996) (“Just because observers [might] find it 
relatively easy to ascribe meanings to products it should not be assumed that these correspond to 
those meanings that inform the actions of individuals when making use of those products.”).  
81 See THOMAS, supra note 62, at 54 (discussing the current omnipresence of luxury brands 
once off-limits to “the masses”). 
82 This should not surprise us. As Umberto Eco explains, 
Obviously fashion codes are less articulate . . . than linguistic codes are. But a code is 
no less a code for the fact that it is weaker than other stronger ones. . . . The fact is 
that communication neither has to do with verbal behaviour alone, nor involves our 
bodily performances alone; communication encompasses the whole of culture. 
Umberto Eco, Social Life as a Sign System, in STRUCTURALISM: AN INTRODUCTION 57, 59 
(David Robey ed., 1979) (1973). 
83 See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
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No doubt some fashion companies will object to the designs in question, 
claiming that consumer-creators could draw on a virtually unlimited amount 
of visual material without using “their property.” (As noted in Part II, 
plaintiffs often trot out this argument in litigation over defendants’ use of 
third-party trademarks for creative ends.) From an equitable standpoint, 
however, these companies would seem to be poorly positioned to lodge such 
complaints. As Jessica Litman has lucidly explained, active consumer 
engagement with the rich symbology of trademarks is the natural result of 
brands’ omnipresent “lifestyle marketing”: 
[I]t is not surprising that speakers and writers are drawn to those devices 
that are, by dint of heavy advertising, doubtlessly universally familiar. 
“Mickey Mouse,” “Twinkies,” “Star Wars,” and “Spam” are trade symbols, 
but they are also now metaphors with meanings their proprietors would not 
have chosen. They got that way in spite of any advertising campaigns because 
the general public invested them with meaning. The value of persuasive trade 
symbols, in short, results from mutual investment by producers and consumers.84 
It is equally unsurprising that consumer-creators’ DIY reflections on 
luxury-fashion trademarks will often strike others as ambiguous.85 For each 
person’s relationship with “luxury fashion”—and all that it might represent—
will differ, and imagery expressing one’s experience or emotions, like 
fashion itself, rarely speaks with the precision of language.86 Indeed, when it 
comes to the DIY works under discussion, “clarity of message” is, at best, 
tangential—and, at worst, counterproductive—to the main objective of the 
endeavor.87  Thus, as discussed below, to scrutinize such fashion for a 
 
84 Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The Public Interest in the Advertising Age, 108 YALE 
L.J. 1717, 1732-33 (1999) (footnotes and internal quotation marks omitted). 
85 Some scholars have thoughtfully examined ambiguity in trademark law from the perspective 
of consumers. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Reconciling Trademark Rights and Expressive 
Values: How to Stop Worrying and Learn to Love Ambiguity, in TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY: A 
HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 261, 286 (Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. 
Janis eds., 2008). Here, I focus specifically on the ambiguity at issue in consumer-creators’ 
affirmative use of marks. 
86 As Fred Davis once put it, “while clothing may say something, it is scarcely involved in 
conversation.” DAVIS, supra note 42, at 7-8 n.5; see also id. at 13 (“[W]hat most distinguishes 
clothing as a mode of communication from speech . . . is that meaningful differences among 
clothing signifiers are not nearly as sharply drawn and standardized as are the spoken sounds 
employed in a speech community.”). Of course, DIY fashion might feature a few words, as do 
some post-parodies presented here, but that remains a long way off from conversation. 
87 See JEAN BAUDRILLARD, FOR A CRITIQUE OF THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE 
SIGN 78-79 (Charles Levin trans., 1981) (“Fashion is one of the more inexplicable phenomena . . . . 
[I]ts compulsion to innovate signs, its apparently arbitrary and perpetual production of meaning—
a kind of meaning drive—and the logical mystery of its cycle are all in fact of the essence . . . .”). 
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“message” in the traditional, linguistic (and, specifically, political) sense of 
the word is to misconstrue the medium in question and thereby undervalue 
its more abstract, but crucial, “role in the production of identities.”88 
In short, I contend that Brian Lichtenberg’s designs, which he describes 
as simultaneously “reverential” and “autonomous,”89 are emblematic of an 
emerging sensibility—one that is precisely what we might expect of 
consumer-creators living in an Internet age and a DIY technology–equipped 
world, where the products of famous brands are powerful,90 but increasingly 
outnumbered, vehicles for “presenting oneself ” to society through appearance 
(a central component of which is one’s preferred apparel). This emerging 
fashion sensibility cannot be understood under the traditional—or, as I will 
consider in Part II, legal—rubric of opposition-or-allegiance. The works in 
question neither swear off luxury fashion nor wholeheartedly embrace its 
allure; instead, they seem to give visual form to the complex attitudes that 
naturally arise toward something both “exclusive” and ubiquitous, venerable yet 
chameleonic, culturally charged yet semiotically contingent on each individual’s 
reaction to it.91 
One might initially be inclined to describe these DIY fashions as “parodies” 
of luxury brands and their products (with the attendant consequences of 
that classification, as discussed in Part II). But the term “parody” utterly 
fails to capture the complex social, psychological, and aesthetic factors 
shaping these goods. The apparel pictured above strongly suggests that, 
unlike traditional parodists, the consumer-creators under discussion do not 
wish to convey a single, or even readily articulable, message. Works of this 
sort are much more likely to convey contradictory impulses and emotions 
 
88 Holliday, supra note 76, at 217; see also Eco, supra note 82, at 59 (“I am speaking through 
my clothes.”). 
89 See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
90 As Professor Dreyfuss has noted, “those who decide to give their marks dominance should 
be deemed to accept the risk that their marks will be used for expressive [ends].” Dreyfuss, supra 
note 85, at 289. 
91 I cannot, of course, definitively prove that this sensibility represents a sea change; such 
changes can only be empirically confirmed after the fact. See JAMESON, supra note 37, at xix 
(“[P]eople become aware of the dynamics of some new system, in which they are themselves 
seized, only later on and gradually.”). With that said, the DIY items under discussion arguably  
challenge René König’s observation about individuals’ attitudes toward fashion in the early 1970s:  
To some, fashion is a manifestation of evil, it represents everything that is damnable. 
To others it opens up, with all its new developments, new horizons, enriches and 
diversifies life and makes it more attractive . . . . These two opinions allow of no 
transitions, no compromise; there are no possibilities of conciliation, only extreme 
and one-sided value judgments. 
KÖNIG, supra note 39, at 29. 
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that elude facile dichotomies, like criticism–adulation and humor–sobriety, 
on which the traditional legal conception of “parody” is premised. 
No, the unifying sentiment of the DIY fashion examined above is not 
humor, not critique, but ambivalence.92 These consumer-creators’ works are a 
means by which individuals can “inscribe[] upon [their] bodies the often 
obscure relationship of art, personal psychology and the social order.”93 If 
one must decide on a single name for this category of works, (somewhat 
reluctantly) taking as a starting point the lexicon of trademark law—for it is 
primarily trademark law that will decide the fate of these goods—the 
products of Lichtenberg and like-minded designers might be best labeled 
“post-parodies.” The generality of this term is perhaps its primary virtue, 
for among the few characteristics common to these works is a shared 
sensibility that both post-dates, and reflects psychological dynamics far 
more complex than, those found in traditional parodies. 
II. TRADEMARK LAW’S “PARODY” DOCTRINE  
AND ITS SHORTCOMINGS 
A. An Introduction to a Willfully One-Dimensional Doctrinal Approach 
Of course, to call the DIY fashions under discussion “post-parodies” 
does not resolve the thorny issue of their appropriate legal treatment. While 
multiple areas of law are potentially implicated in the question of post-parodies’ 
lawfulness, I will focus on the most significant potential obstacle for their 
continued creation and existence: federal trademark law. 
 
92 I use the term “ambivalence” throughout this Essay to mean “uncertainty or fluctuation, 
especially when caused by inability to make a choice or by a simultaneous desire to say or do two 
opposite or conflicting things,” or “the coexistence within an individual of positive and negative 
feelings toward the same person, object, or action, simultaneously drawing him or her in opposite 
directions.” Ambivalence, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/ambivalence 
(last visited Aug. 18, 2014). Notably, some literature from the field of psychology attributes 
significant power to ambivalence:  
[At times, ambivalence] confuses, devours, and tortures. But it also defines and orders, 
transforming the unknown into a knowable opposite. It constructively metaphors 
the world. Ambivalence may appear as competing sides of an image or as a result of 
the contest between to fantasies . . . . A structural feature of every image and fantasy, 
ambivalence belongs to symptom, symbol, and context. Unmediated, the ambivalent 
fusion of opposites devours [the] soul. Mediated by recognition and acceptance, it is 
therapeutic, imaginative, originating and joining. 
Mark Garrison, The Poetics of Ambivalence, 1982 SPRING: ANN. ARCHETYPAL PSYCHOL. & 
JUNGIAN THOUGHT 213, 229. 
93 WILSON, supra note 42, at 247. 
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The foundation of federal trademark law is the Lanham Act, whose 
somewhat skeletal provisions have been fleshed out by numerous judicial 
decisions. The most important language of the Lanham Act, for present 
purposes, is the following: 
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any 
container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or 
device . . . [that] is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive 
as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another 
person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, 
services, or commercial activities by another person . . . shall be liable in a 
civil action by any person who . . . is likely to be damaged by such act.94 
In order to help judges and juries determine whether a defendant’s actions 
have caused a “likelihood of confusion,” each federal circuit has developed a 
multifactor framework that guides the infringement inquiry. These tests are 
not exclusively (or even primarily) concerned with the question of whether 
any actual confusion has occurred. Rather, the multifactor tests purport to 
evaluate “whether, if a defendant is permitted to continue [his conduct], an 
appreciable number of ordinarily prudent purchasers are ‘likely to be 
confused’ about the source, sponsorship, or affiliation of the goods or 
services at issue.”95 
Even with the guidance of specified factors, infringement is a more 
complex inquiry than it might initially appear. For one thing, a tension 
arguably exists between the trademark holder’s interest in controlling the 
mark’s use and the public’s interest in using the mark for critical, expressive, 
creative, comparative, and other purposes.96 In diverse areas of law where 
 
94 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2012) (emphasis added). A separate statutory provision creates a 
cause of action for registered marks, but its differences from the cited provision are not material to 
the present discussion. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 209 (2000) 
(giving substantially similar treatment to the provisions concerning registered and unregistered 
material); see also id. at 210 (“The text of [§ 1125(a)] provides little guidance as to the circumstances 
under which unregistered [material] may be protected.”). 
95 Colman, supra note 66, at *26. But see Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor 
Tests for Trademark Infringement, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1581 (2006) (arguing that a statistical analysis 
reveals that judges place much greater weight on some factors than others, and tend to “stampede” 
remaining factors in order to reach their desired outcome). 
96 It is by no means obvious that post-parodists’ interests are necessarily in tension with those 
of trademark owners; even courts sometimes rely on the argument that “parodies only increase 
fame” to bolster their rulings. See, e.g., Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 
507 F.3d 252, 267 (4th Cir. 2007) (“Indeed, by making the famous mark an object of the parody, a 
successful parody might actually enhance the famous mark’s distinctiveness by making it an icon. 
The brunt of the joke becomes yet more famous.”); Jordache Enters. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F. 
2d 1482, 1489-90 (10th Cir. 1987) (“[B]ecause of the parody aspect of Lardashe, it is not likely that 
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disputes arise due to a perceived conflict between a private right or public 
good and the right to free expression, judges engage in fact-specific balanc-
ing of the interests at stake.97 However, the closest federal trademark 
jurisprudence comes to such policy-based balancing is a doctrine applied to 
“artistic” works making use of others’ trademarks, first announced in the 
1989 case of Rogers v. Grimaldi.98 
Under the Rogers test, the Lanham Act  
will not be applied to expressive works “unless the [use of the trademark or 
other identifying material] has no artistic relevance to the underlying work 
whatsoever, or, if it has some artistic relevance, unless the [use of trademark 
or other identifying material] explicitly misleads as to the source or the 
content of the work.”99 
In the quarter-century of its existence, the Rogers test has often been used to 
adjudicate the lawfulness of traditional trademark “parodies.”100 However, 
the doctrine’s applicability remains limited to “expressive works,” as 
idiosyncratically defined by the courts.101 This limitation means the Rogers 
 
public identification of JORDACHE with the plaintiff will be eroded; indeed, parody tends to 
increase public identification of a plaintiff ’s mark with the plaintiff.”). For the sake of argument, I 
will assume the existence of a conflict between the interests of a trademark owner and a post-parodist 
using the owner’s mark in his work. 
97 See, e.g., David A. Simon, The Confusion Trap: Rethinking Parody in Trademark Law, 88 
WASH. L. REV. 1021, 1034 (2013) (“First Amendment jurisprudence often resorts to ad hoc 
balancing, weighing various interests against each other.”). 
98 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989) (“[I]n general the [Lanham] Act should be construed to 
apply to artistic works only where the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion outweighs 
the public interest in free expression.”); see also Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1235, 1242 (9th 
Cir. 2013) (“The only relevant legal framework for balancing the public’s right to be free from 
consumer confusion . . . and [the defendant’s] First Amendment rights in the context of [a 
Lanham Act] claim is the Rogers test.”). 
99 Brown, 724 F.3d at 1239 (quoting Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999). 
100 See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Parody as Brand, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 473, 
481 (2013) (observing that “recent parody decisions reflect a trend toward the Rogers standard”). 
101 Brown explains this limitation and applies it in the video game context: 
The Rogers test is reserved for expressive works. Even if Madden NFL is not the expressive 
equal of Anna Karenina or Citizen Kane, the Supreme Court has answered with an 
emphatic “yes” when faced with the question of whether video games deserve the 
same protection as more traditional forms of expression . . . . [V]ideo games communicate 
ideas—and even social messages—through many familiar literary devices. . . . Interaction 
between the virtual world of the game and individuals playing the game is prevalent. 
Even if there is a line to be drawn between expressive video games and non-expressive 
video games, and even if courts should at some point be drawing that line, we have 
no need to draw that line here. 
724 F.3d at 1241. 
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doctrine will not necessarily—and in fact, probably will not102—come into 
play in cases involving allegedly (post-)parodic apparel.103 
Far more likely to govern the outcome of litigation over apparel of the 
sort examined above, which makes use of others’ logos for (at least partially) 
expressive or creative ends, is trademark law’s “parody” doctrine. That 
doctrine—unlike the Rogers test—does not prescribe any policy-based 
balancing of the parties’ interests or assessment of the constitutional 
considerations implicated in a particular dispute.104 Instead, the black-letter 
law governing “non-artistic” trademark parodies is almost willfully 
simplistic, hewing closely to (or, arguably, hiding behind) the principle that 
deceptive or misleading speech is simply not entitled to protection under 
the First Amendment.105 
Because the traditional test for trademark infringement is whether a 
defendant’s goods or services are “likely to confuse” consumers as to source 
or affiliation, federal courts often parrot the maxim that disputes over 
trademark parodies require no analysis at all beyond the usual multifactor 
test for trademark infringement. 106  Put differently, either a trademark 
parody is likely to confuse (and thus infringing in nature) or not (and thus 
non-infringing): 
“Some parodies will constitute an infringement, some will not. But the cry 
of ‘parody!’ does not magically fend off otherwise legitimate claims of 
trademark infringement . . . . There are confusing parodies and non-confusing 
parodies. All they have in common is an attempt at humor through the use 
 
102 See, e.g., Simon, supra note 97, at 1027 (discussing how most courts do not use the Rogers 
standard in parody cases, but asserting that it provides the “most promising approach”). 
103 See Harley Davidson, Inc. v. Grottanelli, 164 F.3d 806, 812-13 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing Rogers, 
875 F.2d at 998) (refusing to apply Rogers to the defendant’s “placement of his [allegedly parodic] 
bar-and-shield logo on his newsletter and T-shirts”). Cf. Univ. of Ala. Bd. of Trs. v. New Life Art, 
Inc., 683 F.3d 1266, 1278 (11th Cir. 2012) (finding the defendant’s “paintings, prints, and calendars” 
to be insulated from infringement claims as a matter of law, while holding that Rogers’ applicability 
to the defendant’s “mini-prints, mugs, cups, . . . flags, towels, t-shirts, [and] other mundane 
products” presented “disputed issues of material fact”). 
104 See generally Rebecca Tushnet, Trademark Law as Commercial Speech Regulation, 58 S.C. L. 
REV. 737, 748 (2007) (“The deeper conflict between trademark law and the modern First 
Amendment is that information is rarely completely helpful or completely misleading. The idea 
that prohibitions on fraud improve the information environment depends on truth and falsity 
being pure binaries. Many trademark (and false advertising) cases, however, are more complicated.”). 
105 Id. at 746 (noting the Supreme Court’s view that “trademark laws that regulat[e] confusing 
uses of marks are constitutional because the government may regulate ‘deceptive or misleading’ 
commercial speech” (internal quotations and footnote omitted)). 
106 See, e.g., Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1405 (9th 
Cir. 1997) (“[T]he claim of parody is not really a separate ‘defense’ as such, but merely a way of 
phrasing the traditional response that customers are not likely to be confused as to the source, 
sponsorship or approval.”). 
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of someone else’s trademark. A non-infringing parody is merely amusing, 
not confusing.”107 
Another potential concern for parodists and post-parodists is the rise of 
trademark dilution claims, for which Congress created a federal cause of 
action in 1996 (as overhauled in 2006).108 To win a trademark dilution case, 
a trademark owner–plaintiff need not prove “likelihood of confusion.” 
Instead, he must show a “likelihood of dilution,” which can arise where a 
defendant’s conduct creates an “association arising from the similarity 
between a mark and a trade name and a famous mark that impairs the 
distinctiveness of the [plaintiff ’s] famous mark.”109 While the Lanham Act’s 
dilution provisions do provide a safe harbor for specified “fair uses” that 
might include certain parodies,110 the uncertain scope of this immunity111 
keeps potential dilution liability very much in play for parodic goods.112 
 
107 Id. (quoting J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 31.38 (rev. ed. 1995)). 
108 The Ninth Circuit explained the relevant legislative and doctrinal developments in Levi 
Strauss & Co. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co.: 
[In 2003,] the Supreme Court handed down a decision that greatly impacted many 
courts of appeals’ interpretations of the [Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA)]. 
In Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003), the Court held . . . that the 
text of the FTDA “unambiguously requires a showing of actual dilution, rather than 
a likelihood of dilution.”. . . However, this requirement of actual dilution was not 
long-lived. In 2006, largely in response to the Moseley decision, Congress enacted 
the [Trademark Dilution Revision Act (TDRA)]. In doing so, Congress did not 
simply alter the language on which the Court in Moseley had relied; instead, Congress 
replaced the FTDA with a more detailed statute. The TDRA did provide relief for 
“likely,” as opposed to actual, dilution. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1). However, it also explicitly 
provided relief for dilution “by blurring” or by “tarnishment,” id., and defined both 
types of dilution, id. § 1125(c)(2)(ii). 
633 F.3d 1158, 1165-66 (9th Cir. 2011). 
109 Id. at 1171 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B) (2012)). 
110 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A) (creating a defense to federal trademark-dilution liability for 
“[a]ny fair use . . . of a famous mark by another person . . . , including use in connection with . . . 
identifying and parodying, criticizing, or commenting upon the famous mark owner”). 
111 See Simon, supra note 97, at 1051 (noting that, while the Lanham Act “exempts parody (and 
criticism and commentary) as fair use when the parodic use is not done as a mark[,] it says nothing 
about parodic uses that are source identifying”); see also Dogan & Lemley, supra note 100, at 504-12 
(highlighting doctrinal uncertainties). 
112 See generally Dogan & Lemley, supra note 100, at 483 (noting that some courts disfavor “fair 
use” parody claims because of “a general aversion to free riding”). The skepticism noted by Dogan 
and Lemley is evident in the language of judicial decisions like Deere & Co. v. MTD Products, Inc.: 
Sellers of commercial products who wish to attract attention to their commercials or 
products and thereby increase sales by poking fun at widely recognized marks of 
noncompeting products . . . risk diluting the selling power of the mark that is made 
 
8 Colman Final.docx (DO NOT DELETE)  8/28/2014 3:07 PM 
2014] TRADEMARK LAW AND POST-PARODIES 43 
In short, when speaking of trademark law’s “parody” jurisprudence, the 
doctrinal analysis is theoretically bifurcated. Yet the central problems, from 
the post-parodist’s perspective, are largely the same, no matter the cause of 
action. First, trademark law’s definition of permissible “parodies” has grown 
narrower, more formalistic, and less reflective in recent decades. Second, 
that definition of “parody” is essentially incompatible with the creative 
expression that defines the post-parodic sensibility. 
B. Some Early, Thoughtful Judicial Engagement with Trademark Parodies and 
the Progressively Less Thoughtful Jurisprudence that Followed 
In a few early appellate-court decisions involving traditional trademark 
parodies, judges engaged thoughtfully with the genre. In L.L. Bean v. Drake 
Publishers, for instance, the First Circuit undertook a somewhat ambitious 
treatment of trademark parodies in an appeal concerning a two-page adult-
magazine spread entitled “L.L. Beam’s Back-To-School-Sex-Catalog.” 113 
The defendant in that case had drawn the ire of apparel and consumer-goods 
company L.L. Bean by “display[ing] a facsimile of Bean’s trademark and 
featured pictures of nude models in sexually explicit positions using ‘products’ 
that were described in a crudely humorous fashion.”114 
The panel majority began by observing that “[p]arody is a humorous 
form of social commentary and literary criticism that dates back as far as 
Greek antiquity.”115 The First Circuit then reminded the litigants that, 
despite recent rhetoric describing trademarks as a form of “property,” 
“[t]rademark rights do not entitle the owner to quash an unauthorized use 
of the mark by another who is communicating ideas or expressing points of 
view”; indeed, such “unauthorized uses” might be necessary to effectively 
comment on contemporary American culture:  
One need only open a magazine or turn on television to witness the pervasive 
influence of trademarks in advertising and commerce. Designer labels appear 
on goods ranging from handbags to chocolates to every possible form of 
clothing. Commercial advertising slogans, which can be registered as 
 
fun of. When this occurs, not for worthy purposes of expression, but simply to sell 
products, that purpose can easily be achieved in other ways. The potentially diluting 
effect is even less deserving of protection when the object of the joke is the mark of a 
directly competing product. 
41 F.3d 39, 44-45 (2d Cir. 1994) (internal citations omitted). In Section II.C, I question the 
federal courts’ purported capacity to evaluate the “worthiness” of allegedly dilutive expression. 
113 L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 27-34 (1st Cir. 1987). 
114 Id. at 27. 
115 Id. at 28. 
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trademarks, have become part of national political campaigns. “Thus, 
trademarks have become a natural target of satirists who seek to comment 
on this integral part of the national culture.”116 
Although the district court had found “trademark dilution” in the possi-
bility that the defendant’s spoof might “tarnish” L.L. Bean’s “wholesome” 
brand with “images of impurity,” 117  the First Circuit cautioned that 
“[n]either the strictures of the first amendment nor the history and theory 
of anti-dilution law permit a finding of [dilution by] tarnishment based 
solely on the presence of an unwholesome or negative context in which a 
trademark is used without authorization.”118 The First Circuit, seemingly 
cognizant of potential overreaching by plaintiffs once trademark rights are 
untethered from the notion of confusion, laid down a bright-line rule: “The 
Constitution does not . . . permit the range of the anti-dilution statute to 
encompass the unauthorized use of a trademark in a noncommercial setting 
such as an editorial or artistic context.”119  
The court then addressed the significance of the parodic nature of 
defendant’s work, explaining that its “reluctance to apply the anti-dilution 
 
116 Id. at 28-29 (quoting Harriette K. Dorsen, Satiric Appropriation and the Law of Libel, 
Trademark and Copyright: Remedies Without Wrongs, 65 B.U. L. REV. 923, 939 (1985)). 
117 Id. at 27, 30-31. Presumably because even the most unsophisticated readers of the “L.L. 
Beam Back-To-School-Sex-Catalog” would not be “likely to confuse” the satirical spread as being 
associated with the staid apparel and outdoor-goods company whose ubiquitous catalogs it 
spoofed, L.L. Bean’s lawsuit hinged not on trademark infringement but rather on trademark 
dilution under Maine’s anti-dilution statute. (The federal Lanham Act did not yet include an 
anti-dilution provision.)  
The First Circuit supplied its understanding of anti-dilution statutes’ purpose: 
Anti-dilution statutes have developed to fill a void left by the failure of trademark 
infringement law to curb the unauthorized use of marks where there is no likelihood 
of confusion between the original use and the infringing use. The law of trademark 
dilution aims to protect the distinctive quality of a trademark from deterioration 
caused by its use on dissimilar products. 
Id. at 30. 
118 Id. at 31. 
119 Id. at 33. Chief Judge Campbell, dissenting, would have declined to rule at that stage of 
the litigation; he instead favored certifying key issues for consideration by the Maine Supreme 
Court, which would, in his words, “permit the state court to decide whether or not a pornographic 
parody of this type constitutes trademark dilution under the Maine statute.” Id. at 35 (Campbell, 
C.J., dissenting). Chief Judge Campbell would have taken this approach despite recognizing that 
“[t]he Maine Supreme Judicial Court has expressed an unwillingness, as a matter of policy, to 
accept a certified question that will not be dispositive of a federal case.” Id. Arguably, Chief Judge 
Campbell’s dissent was emblematic of a broader judicial discomfort with parodies. As David 
Simon writes, “[t]he issue of what constitutes a parody in trademark law, and what legal effect that 
finding should have, has been confusing courts for decades.” Simon, supra note 97, at 1024. 
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statute to the instant case also stems from a recognition of the vital importance 
of parody,” a medium “deserving of substantial freedom—both as entertainment 
and as a form of social and literary criticism.”120 The court elaborated on the 
genre’s importance to a free society: 
Trademark parodies, even when offensive, do convey a message. The message 
may be simply that business and product images need not always be taken 
too seriously; a trademark parody reminds us that we are free to laugh at 
the images and associations linked with the mark. The message also may be 
a simple form of entertainment conveyed by juxtaposing the irreverent 
representation of the trademark with the idealized image created by the 
mark’s owner. . . . While such a message lacks explicit political content, that 
is no reason to afford it less protection under the first amendment. . . . 
Denying parodists the opportunity to poke fun at symbols and names which 
have become woven into the fabric of our daily life, would constitute a serious 
curtailment of a protected form of expression.121 
In the decades since L.L. Bean, however, courts seem to have grown less 
contemplative of parody’s social value.122 Most courts now require that 
trademark parodists, in order to avoid a finding of infringement, demonstrate 
that they have “not only differentiate[d] the alleged parody from the 
original but . . . also communicate[d] some articulable element of satire, 
ridicule, joking, or amusement.”123 Further, the federal appellate courts have 
reached a general consensus that trademark “‘parody’ is defined as a simple 
 
120 L.L. Bean, 811 F.2d at 33 (quoting Berlin v. E.C. Publ’ns, 329 F.2d 541, 545 (2d Cir. 1964)). 
121 Id. at 34. 
122 The reasons for this change are numerous, but the most direct cause is likely an intervening 
Supreme Court decision, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580-81 (1994), which 
prompted lower courts to draw a questionable distinction between non-infringing “parodies” 
(works that mock the intellectual property owner–plaintiff, specifically) and infringing “satires” 
(works that use a plaintiff ’s intellectual property for commentary that is not plaintiff-specific). See 
Bruce P. Keller & Rebecca Tushnet, Even More Parodic than the Real Thing: Parody Lawsuits 
Revisited, 94 TRADEMARK REP. 979, 979 (2004) (“One of Campbell’s most significant—and 
unsatisfying—effects has been to elevate parody . . . and devalue satire. Several courts have since 
explicitly relied on the distinction . . . even though the actual language from the Court’s opinion 
counsels a more sensitive approach.”). The L.L. Bean court had defined “parodies” broadly, but 
various courts have read the decision in a revisionist manner, probably to synthesize it with the 
post-Campbell parody-versus-satire jurisprudence. See, e.g., United We Stand Am., Inc. v. United We 
Stand, Am. N.Y., Inc., 128 F.3d 86, 91-92 (2d Cir. 1997) (distinguishing L.L. Bean as a case where 
the plaintiff ’s trademark was “an integral part of the humorous message” and the defendant 
“poked fun at the plaintiff, but did not cause consumer confusion”). 
123 Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 260 (4th Cir. 
2007) (emphasis added). 
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form of entertainment” intended to serve as a vehicle for ridicule or humor.124 
Even if a would-be parodist meets this standard, he can only avoid in-
fringement and dilution liability if he has “successfully” conveyed “two 
simultaneous—and contradictory—messages: that [his work] is the original, 
but also that it is not the original and is instead a parody.”125 If a would-be 
parody is “unsuccessful”—however that might be determined by a particular 
court in a particular case126—it will be found infringing or dilutive.127 
C. Under Current Parody Doctrine, Courts Evaluating a (Post-)Parodic Work’s 
“Success” Will Often Find Themselves Forced Either to Hear What Isn’t There  
or to Plug Their Ears 
The most recent factually analogous appellate decision to any material 
resembling the post-parodies depicted in Part I is the Fourth Circuit’s 2007 
decision in Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Haute Diggity Dog.128 That decision 
places in high relief one crucial respect in which trademark law’s current 
parody doctrine cannot meaningfully evaluate works defined by a post-
parodic sensibility. 
In Haute Diggity Dog, the famous (and famously litigious) luxury fashion 
house Louis Vuitton filed suit over a dog toy that “loosely resemble[d] 
miniature handbags and undisputedly evoke[d Louis Vuitton] handbags of 
similar shape, design, and color.”129 The Fourth Circuit panel began by 
dutifully reciting the black-letter law of trademark parody—a conglomeration 
of the rules quoted in Sections II.A and II.B: 
 
124
 Id. (quoting People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359, 366 
(4th Cir. 2001)). 
125 Id. (quoting Doughney, 263 F.3d at 366). 
126 As the following Section illustrates, determining such “success” is a perilous endeavor; 
rare is the judge who acknowledges the danger or futility of such efforts: 
Yankee asks this court to engage in literary criticism—judging how successful New 
York’s expressive message was. It is one thing to reject a First Amendment claim because 
the court disbelieves the claim that a communicative message was intended. It is 
quite another to reject a First Amendment claim because the court gives low marks 
to the success of the literary device. Courts are ill equipped to pass literary judgments. 
Yankee Publ’g Inc. v. News Am. Publ’g Inc., 809 F. Supp. 267, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (Leval, J.). 
127 As noted above, I do not focus extensively on the infringement–dilution distinction in this 
Essay because post-parodic goods will likely suffer under both doctrines, for largely the same 
reasons. See supra Section II.A. 
128 Haute Diggity Dog, 507 F.3d at 260. 
129 Id. at 258. 
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For trademark purposes, “[a] ‘parody’ is defined as a simple form of 
entertainment conveyed by juxtaposing the irreverent representation of the 
trademark with the idealized image created by the mark’s owner.” . . . “A 
parody must convey two simultaneous—and contradictory—messages: that 
it is the original, but also that it is not the original and is instead a parody.” . . . 
This second message must not only differentiate the alleged parody from 
the original but must also communicate some articulable element of satire, 
ridicule, joking, or amusement.130 
The court then explained that “[b]ecause Haute Diggity Dog’s arguments 
with respect to the [likelihood-of-confusion] factors depend to a great 
extent on whether its products and marks are successful parodies,” it would 
first decide “whether Haute Diggity Dog’s products, marks, and trade dress 
are indeed successful parodies of [Louis Vuitton]’s marks and trade dress” 
before moving on to a traditional analysis of infringement and dilution.131 
 
Figure 16: Louis Vuitton “Multicolor Monogram” Handbag132 
	  
 
130 Id. at 260. Louis Vuitton brought various claims, but only the federal trademark and trade-dress 
claims, which I will discuss collectively as its “trademark” claims, concern us here. 
131 Id. As David Simon explains, this so-called “infusion” framework—in varying forms—
appears in many post-Campbell trademark parody decisions. Simon, supra note 97, at 1033. 
132 Multicolor Monogram Cruise HandBag by Louis Vuitton, BAGS BY LOUIS VUITTON, http://
 bagsbylouisvuitton.blogspot.com/2011/04/multicolor-monogram-cruise-handbag-by.html (last visited 
Aug. 18, 2014). 
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Figure 17: Haute Diggity Dog’s “Chewy Vuiton” Chew Toy133 
 
 
In a surprisingly brief and entirely citationless analysis, the Fourth 
Circuit wrote: 
No one can doubt that LVM handbags are the target of the imitation by 
Haute Diggity Dog’s “Chewy Vuiton” dog toys. At the same time, no one 
can doubt also that the “Chewy Vuiton” dog toy is not the “idealized image” 
of the mark created by [Louis Vuitton]. . . . 
[T]he juxtaposition of the similar and dissimilar—the irreverent representation 
and the idealized image of an [Louis Vuitton] handbag—immediately conveys 
a joking and amusing parody. The furry little “Chewy Vuiton” imitation, as 
something to be chewed by a dog, pokes fun at the elegance and expensive-
ness of a LOUIS VUITTON handbag, which must not be chewed by a dog. 
The [Louis Vuitton] handbag is provided for the most elegant and well-to-do 
celebrity, to proudly display to the public and the press, whereas the imitation 
“Chewy Vuiton” “handbag” is designed to mock the celebrity and be used 
by a dog. The dog toy irreverently presents haute couture as an object for 
casual canine destruction. The satire is unmistakable. The dog toy is a 
 
133 Does This Chinese Cabbie Love Louis Vuitton? Or Hate Them?, THE KNOCKOFF ECONOMY 
(Aug. 29, 2012), http://www.theknockoffeconomy.com/does-this-chinese-cabbie-love-louis-vuitton-or-
hate-them. 
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comment on the rich and famous, on the LOUIS VUITTON name and 
related marks, and on conspicuous consumption in general.134  
Thus, the following points proved dispositive for the defendant: (1) that 
its parody succeeds, in part, because an actual Louis Vuitton bag “must not 
be chewed by a dog [and yet the parody] presents haute couture as an object 
for casual canine destruction”; (2) that its dog toy was “irreverent” in 
nature; (3) that the defendant’s product “immediately” conveys its parodic, 
and thus “amusing,” character; and (4) that the product “is a comment on 
the rich and famous, on the LOUIS VUITTON name and related marks, 
and on conspicuous consumption in general.”135 
Having checked off these boxes, the Fourth Circuit panel confidently 
concluded that the criteria for a “successful parody” were “amply satisfied in 
this case,” with “the ‘Chewy Vuiton’ dog toys [having conveyed] ‘just 
enough of the original design to allow the consumer to appreciate the point 
of parody,’ but stop[ping] well short of appropriating the entire marks.”136 
The court nevertheless continued its discussion, purporting to apply the 
likelihood-of-confusion factors but doing so in an unabashedly outcome-
driven manner that served solely to undergird the “parody” determination 
already made.137  
Problematically, the court’s core analysis (excerpted above) glosses over 
several important issues. The panel neglected to specify, for example, 
whether its characterization of the chew toy as “unmistakable satire” was a 
factual finding, made as a matter of law based on the record—or something 
 
134 Haute Diggity Dog, 507 F.3d at 260-61. 
135 Id. at 261. 
136 Id. The court essentially went through the motions once more in its trademark dilution 
“analysis.” See id. at 265-67 (“[A]s Haute Diggity Dog’s ‘Chewy Vuiton’ marks are a successful 
parody, we conclude that they will not blur the distinctiveness of the famous mark . . . .”).  
The court’s dilution discussion is notable, however, for the panel’s unequivocal assertion—
assumption, even—that the defendant’s dog toy was ineligible for the Lanham Act’s parody “fair 
use” defense due to the “defendant’s use of [its] parody as a mark.” Id. at 267. With little analysis, 
the court characterized the defendant’s use of Louis Vuitton’s trademarks and trade dress as “a 
designation of source for the [defendant’s] own goods or services,” which deprived the defendant of 
immunity from dilution liability. Id. at 266 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A) (2012)). This lax 
analysis is perhaps unsurprising, given the continued uncertainty surrounding the notion of 
“trademark use,” but it nevertheless provides potential cause for concern among parodists and 
post-parodists alike. 
137 See id. at 267. (“[B]ecause the famous mark is particularly strong and distinctive, it becomes 
more likely that a parody will not impair the distinctiveness of the mark.”). After engaging in this 
arguably circular reasoning, the panel did go on to point out that the outcome might have differed 
if the defendant had used plaintiff ’s actual mark rather than “adopt[ing] imperfectly the items of 
[Louis Vuitton]’s designs.” Id. at 268.  
As for the plaintiff ’s copyright claim, the court treated it as an afterthought, disposing of it in 
a single paragraph at the end of its opinion. See id. at 269-70. 
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more akin to judicial notice, and thus necessarily contingent on the presid-
ing judges’ background knowledge, assumptions, perceptive capabilities, and 
even senses of humor. The panel likewise declined to explain whether its 
determinations concerning this “unmistakable satire” and defendant’s social 
“commentary” were driven primarily or exclusively by (1) the parodist’s 
actual intent; (2) the parodist’s apparent intent, as perceived by the defend-
ant’s (or, alternatively, Louis Vuitton’s) target audience; (3) the parodist’s 
apparent intent, as perceived by an “ordinary” and “reasonable” consumer; 
or (d) the actual effect on consumers—decided as a matter of law—without 
regard for the parodist’s subjective intent. These ambiguities are notable 
because (1) they suggest an insufficiently nuanced analysis of communicative 
dynamics in the parodic context (if not in trademark disputes, more generally), 
and (2) they mirror issues likely to arise if (or, rather, when) a post-parody 
becomes the subject of litigation. 
Perhaps the Fourth Circuit panel simply did not consider these potentially 
troublesome details. It may be unseemly to fault those trained primarily in 
law for failing to take account of the basic principle of linguistics that 
“[c]ommonly a speaker cannot explicate with precision what he meant to get 
across, and on these occasions if hearers think they know precisely, they will 
likely be at least a little off.”138 Nevertheless, where presiding courts make 
such assumptions—consciously or not—they slight both the parties to 
litigation and the members of the public for whom that litigation may well 
determine substantive rights. The fault in such instances lies in “a kind of 
reductionism [resulting from] claiming to have discovered the one true 
interpretation” when there are invariably a “multiplicity of meanings present.”139 
 
138 ERVING GOFFMAN, FORMS OF TALK 10 (2d ed. 1983). 
139 ROBERT WUTHNOW ET AL., 5 CULTURAL ANALYSIS: THE WORK OF PETER L. 
BERGER, MARY DOUGLAS, MICHEL FOUCAULT, AND JÜRGEN HABERMAS 83 (2010 ed. 
2013). Leading theorists have recognized that “there is never just one meaning that can be 
conveyed by a system of symbols”: while a single “‘interpretation’ may be insightful for some 
purposes,” it will always fall short of “the set of rich meanings which are there in the social setting 
itself.” Id.  
To be sure, this rush to interpretation is by no means confined to the judiciary: 
[Both social theorists and economists—or rational-strategy theorists—often] presume 
that the behaviour of individuals reflects decision-making and choice and it is on this 
basis that they proceed to ‘interpret’ their conduct. The only difference between the 
assumptions embodied in the two varieties of social theory is that while the [latter] 
presumes that conduct is oriented to the utility of goods, [sociologists] presume that 
it is oriented to their symbolic meanings. Typically, however, neither group bother[s] 
to verify their assumptions; that is, to check with consumers themselves concerning 
the nature and meaning of their actions. 
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If, on the other hand, presiding judges’ interpretive choices go beyond 
inadvertent or deliberate-but-intuitive assumptions—if the Haute Diggity 
Dog panel addressed “interpretive uncertainties and discrepancies . . . [by] 
exploit[ing them] after the fact to [strategically reconstruct] what the 
speaker indeed by and large meant”140—then the parties and the public are 
hardly any better off. Indeed, when courts, “because of unacknowledged 
interests [base their rulings on] pseudo-communication,” the result may be a 
“systematic distortion” of doctrine that prevents candid engagement with 
real “values and facts” and thus fails to resolve conflicting interests in a 
transparent and principled manner.141 
In short, it is worrisome to see courts applying trademark law’s “unambiguous 
message” approach to parodic (and post-parodic) works by pretending to 
hear what isn’t there. Yet it is equally unsatisfactory for judges to plug their 
ears to block out individually and socially valuable expression. The shortcomings 
of the latter approach are vividly illustrated in the 2012 decision of Louis 
Vuitton v. Hyundai.142 There, a judge in the Southern District of New York 
took a different tack from that of the Fourth Circuit when confronted with 
a work that incorporated a third-party trademark. Instead of making 
subjective interpretive leaps, the district court evaluated the purported 
parody’s “success” by placing rigid, unwarranted limits on cognizable expression. 
The Hyundai case was sparked by yet another complaint by Louis Vuitton, 
this time over the alleged infringement and dilution of its “toile monogram” 
trade dress.143 The basis for the fashion house’s new lawsuit was a Hyundai 
 
CAMPBELL, supra note 80, at 96. That said, the phenomenon might well be of greater concern in 
the context of the U.S. judiciary, due to the prospective aspect of precedent. 
140 GOFFMAN, supra note 138, at 11. 
141 WUTHNOW ET AL., supra note 139, at 224 (emphasis omitted). 
142 Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A., v. Hyundai Motor Am., No. 10-1611, 2012 WL 1022247 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2012). 
143
 See Charles Colman, Louis Vuitton Sends Absurd Cease-and-Desist Letter to Penn Law Over 
Student Event Flyer (and More Fun with Trademark Abuse!), LAW OF FASHION (Mar. 3, 2012), 
http://lawoffashion.com/ blog/story/03/03/2012/121: 
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commercial aired during the Super Bowl that “included a one-second shot 
of a basketball decorated with a distinctive pattern resembling the famous 
trademarks of plaintiff Louis Vuitton.”144 
 
Figure 18: Still of Commercial Clip at Issue in Hyundai145 
 
Like many post-parodic works, Hyundai’s commercial expressed a view 
of “luxury” that was, in a sense, ambivalent: 
[As] explained by Hyundai, “The symbols of ‘old’ luxury, including the 
[Louis Vuitton] Marks, were used as part of the Commercial’s humorous 
social commentary on the need to redefine luxury during a recession. . . . 
The commercial poked fun at these symbols of ‘old’ luxury to distinguish 
them from [Hyundai] in an effort to challenge consumers to rethink what it 
means for a product to be luxurious.”146 
In other words, the Hyundai commercial “poked fun” at luxury, not to 
swear it off altogether, but rather to redefine the concept. Of course, 
Hyundai’s desire to have consumers reconsider the meaning of luxury 
served the company’s own interests, but (as noted in Section II.A) that does 
 
144 Hyundai, 2012 WL 1022247, at *1. 
145 Chris Shunk, Hyundai Sued by Louis Vuitton over High-End Basketball, AUTOBLOG (Mar. 5, 
2010, 11:29 AM), http://www.autoblog.com/2010/03/05/report-hyundai-sued-by-louis-vuitton-over-high-
end-basketball. 
146 Hyundai, 2012 WL 1022247, at *2. 
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not, factually or doctrinally, undermine the presence of non-commercial 
expression in the work. 
Indeed, Hyundai emphasized to the court that its use of the Louis Vuitton 
imagery was “‘expressive’ in nature”147—but the district court would have 
none of it. In a passage that encapsulates nearly everything that is wrong 
with—or, at least, woefully antiquated in—trademark law’s current parody 
doctrine, the court wrote: 
[Hyundai’s] ad is not expressive in the sense that the word is used in trademark 
law . . . . Hyundai has acknowledged that it intended to make no comment 
on the Louis Vuitton mark, but instead offered a broader social critique. 
The Second Circuit has deemed such motivations unworthy of protection.148 
The decisive issue for trademark infringement liability, in the court’s 
view, was “whether Hyundai Sonata consumers have made misinformed 
purchasing decisions based on Louis Vuitton’s role in the ‘Luxury’ ad”—an 
issue of which Hyundai had supposedly lost sight in “focus[ing] heavily on 
the ad’s purportedly expressive nature and the protections that should be 
afforded to it.”149 In a passage that cuts straight to the heart of the crude 
and speech-chilling nature of trademark law’s rules concerning “parodies,” 
the court distinguished earlier cases favoring parodist-defendants by 
condemning Hyundai’s message as “far more subtle.”150 
That a work’s subtlety was a ticket to a finding of infringement exposes 
the cramped, outdated, and arbitrary view of “worthy” speech that now 
pervades trademark law’s parody doctrine. If this spells bad news for 
traditional trademark parodies, it spells near-certain doom for post-parodies. 
For the characteristic ambivalence of post-parodic works, as illustrated by 
the works depicted in Part I, tends to take visual forms that, like surrealist 
art, escapes a definitive, fixed, and readily articulable message.151 
Thus, whereas the Haute Diggity Dog panel apparently felt comfortable 
grafting its own views of fashion onto the dog toy at issue, the presiding 
judge in Hyundai refused to meaningfully engage with the somewhat more 
complex expressive content of the defendant’s commercial. Instead, the 
 
147 Id. at *9. 
148 Id. at *9, *26 (emphasis added). 
149 Id. at *21. 
150 Id. at *26. 
151 As leading social and communication theorists have recognized, “the connection between 
speech acts and what the speaker really means to say is never perfect.” WUTHNOW ET AL., supra 
note 139, at 185. Where the “speech act” in question takes the form of primarily nonlinguistic 
visual imagery, as in many of the Section I.A post-parodies, “the subjective intentions, feelings, 
and meaning of the speaker” may not be fully legible to the audience. Id.; see also Eco, supra note 
82, at 58-59 (discussing the complexity of signals transmitted through clothing). 
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court fell back on the dogmatic, black-or-white, “criticism-or-adulation” 
distinction whose absence defines the post-parodic sensibility—a sensibility 
that, as explained in Part I, is the inevitable product of recent events in 
fashion history, the high-end fashion sector’s own business strategies, and 
the growing availability of DIY technology to consumer-creators in the 
Internet age. 
D. Asking the Wrong Question Will Rarely Yield a Helpful Answer 
In its current state, trademark law cannot guide judges’ evaluation of the 
lawfulness of fashion post-parodies in a principled, meaningful way. Courts 
presiding over trademark parody cases purport to ask very specific questions. 
But that endeavor, when applied to works that do not fall into the narrow 
parameters of traditional parodies, will only lead courts to (1) hear something 
that isn’t there or (2) artificially limit their definition of cognizable speech. 
Both the ad hoc nature of the former approach and the categorical prohibition 
of the latter will chill a form of creative expression that is valuable, at the 
very least, because it empowers consumers who wish to be seen in a visual 
culture still controlled in large part by conglomerates whose financial 
success often requires managing what consumers do and do not see.  
Even if the tradeoff made in current parody doctrine between the rights 
of trademark owners and third-party speakers somehow represents desirable 
public policy, it is nevertheless indefensible as the proper rule for post-parodies—
if only because the so-called “articulable message” approach is a conceptual 
non sequitur to the post-parodic project.152 To try to analyze post-parodic 
works, like those pictured in Part I, through trademark law’s one-dimensional 
parody doctrine is akin to asking whether a personal diary “is persuasive,” to 
query whether a wholly abstract sculpture “supports fiscal reform,” or to 
inquire about the “credibility” of a dessert. In each instance, the questioner 
attempts to make value judgments about objects whose very nature is alien 
to the analytical framework used. The creators of the diary, the sculpture, 
and the dessert can no more answer the questions posed than a scientist 
could state whether his data is “heartfelt,” a political speechwriter could list 
the shapes in nature his oratory most closely resembles, or a jury could 
evaluate whether a witness’s testimony is “ambrosial.” Asking the wrong 
question will almost always fail to produce an illuminating answer. 
 
152 See Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 260 (4th Cir. 
2007) (“A parody must . . . communicate some articulable element of satire, ridicule, joking, or 
amusement.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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Unfortunately, in the fashion context, at least, federal judges may be 
unwilling to make a genuine effort to understand post-parodic works.153 The 
Fourth Circuit judges who read into the Haute Diggity Dog chew toy “a 
comment on the rich and famous, on the LOUIS VUITTON name and 
related marks, and on conspicuous consumption in general”154 arguably 
revealed their personal views on the subject of fashion as if through a 
Rorschach inkblot test.155  
Although the “quite special rage reserved for fashionable dressing [actually 
underscores the fact] that dress speaks the irrational-unconscious in a 
special way,”156 few federal judges have shown themselves capable of rising 
above the fray—of recognizing the “important imaginative function, the 
spiritually enlarging character of fashion.”157 This prejudice is as misguided 
as it is disappointing. Judges should recognize that, as Elizabeth Wilson has 
written, “[if] the self in all its aspects appears threatened in modern society, 
then fashion becomes an important—indeed vital—medium in the recrea-
tion of the lost self,” and that “for the individual to lay claim to a particular 
style may be more than ever a lifeline, a proof that one does at least exist.”158 
Realistically, however, including such florid prose in a judicial opinion, as 
one might to bolster a ruling for a post-parodist, would require a judge to 
 
153 See generally Colman, supra note 39, at 57-58 (“[F]ederal judges presiding over [fashion-related] 
cases still make their distaste for the subject matter clear . . . .”). The only plausible alternative to 
this account of willful resistance, it would seem, is an inability to appreciate the dynamics in play 
when it comes to trademarks, consumer culture, and parodies. See Dreyfuss, supra note 85, at 293 
(“[I]t is clear from the way certain judges write that they just don’t get it—that they are not 
gripped by language and remain unworried by trademark holders’ assault on the arsenal guarding 
‘the vibrancy of our culture.’ I wonder, too, about their senses of humor.”). It is difficult to say 
which of these two possibilities is more worrisome. 
154 Haute Diggity Dog, 507 F.3d at 261. 
155 This phenomenon is likely driven by (largely subconscious) aspects of social behavior and 
facilitated by the U.S. legal system’s lack of formalized interpretive tools for visual material. I analyze 
the former in a working article on judicial projection of internalized social norms—specifically, in the 
context of fin-de-siècle design-patent jurisprudence. See Charles E. Colman, Patents and Perverts 
(Aug. 1, 2014) (abstract), available at http:// papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2477459. 
For an insightful discussion of the latter, see Elizabeth G. Porter, Taking Images Seriously, 114 
COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (noting that “courts take language seriously” but that “[t]here 
are no corresponding traditions in law to guide the interpretation of images,” so there is “a danger 
that implicit biases and naïve realism—the belief that an image represents a transparent window 
onto a single truth—will infect judges’ decisions” (footnote omitted)). 
156 WILSON, supra note 42, at 235.  
157 HOLLANDER, supra note 58, at 20. 
158 WILSON, supra note 42, at 122. Some anthropological analysis suggests that the derision 
leveled at fashion stems from humans’ aversion to “ambiguity in boundaries.” Id. at 132. 
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reveal a degree of vulnerability—humanity?—that many on the federal bench 
deem imprudent on ideological, instrumental, or reputational grounds.159 
Yet this is precisely the sort of nondogmatic, human response required of 
judges presiding over cases implicating First Amendment values.160 Contra-
ry to the Hyundai court’s proclamation that subtle expression is less “wor-
thy” of protection than is blunt (and, in many instances, less effective) 
speech, neither First Amendment jurisprudence nor most members of 
American society are concerned solely with protecting explicit, targeted, 
traditionally political speech. Such speech may be conceptually easier and 
less emotionally challenging for judges to address in their decisions, but 
surely obstacles of this nature should not drive our jurisprudence. 
Instead, the appropriate doctrine governing post-parodies must start by 
recognizing that, as professors Stacey Dogan and Mark Lemley have 
argued, we all “benefit from a culture that allows subtle references and word 
play that draws from a variety of cultural reference points . . . even if the 
 
159 Consider once more the following passage by Anne Hollander, who describes the myriad 
functions of fashion: “Western fashion offers a visual way out of the trap of tradition, the prison of 
unquestioning wisdom. Fashion allows clothing to create an image of skepticism, of comic 
possibility, of different powers and alternative thoughts, of manifold chances, of escape from fixed 
meanings and fixed roles.” HOLLANDER, supra note 58, at 19-20.  
Now imagine a judge including that passage, or some variation of it, in a dispositive decision 
declining to impose liability on a post-parodic designer. How might the public react? The 
following commentary on Justice Anthony Kennedy provides some idea of the risks involved: 
[Justice Kennedy apparently] believes it is the role of the Court in general and himself 
in particular to align the messy reality of American life with an inspiring and highly 
abstracted set of ideals . . . . [In one reproductive rights opinion, Justice Kennedy in-
cluded] a paean to the “heart of liberty,” which he said must include “the right to 
define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery 
of human life”—a phrase Scalia archly ridiculed as the “sweet-mystery-of-life passage.” 
Undaunted, in the partial-birth case, Kennedy included a sweet-mystery-of-fetal-life 
passage: “The government may use its voice and its regulatory authority to show its 
profound respect for the life within the woman.” Never mind that the two sweet 
mysteries clash with each other . . . . Anthony Kennedy doesn’t much care whether 
his abstractions are true; the important thing for him is that he wants them to be true. 
Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Leader: The Arrogance of Anthony Kennedy, NEW REPUBLIC (June 16, 2007), 
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/supreme-leader-the-arrogance-anthony-kennedy. 
160 To be clear, I hesitate to place all of post-parodists’ eggs in the First Amendment basket, 
in part because, as Professor Dreyfuss has suggested, the First Amendment might be “simply too 
blunt an instrument to parse rights to individual words; perhaps its focus on the communication of 
ideas makes it an inappropriate way to think about the linguistic material by which ideas are 
conveyed.” Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi 
Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397, 398 (1990). Dreyfuss’s concern is all the more acute 
where “the material by which ideas are conveyed” is not lexical but imagery-based. See supra 
Section I.A. 
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use causes some level of confusion.”161 Indeed, few would disagree with the 
proposition that “the rich connotations and implicit understandings present 
in any concrete situation are never captured fully or expressed adequately in 
language.”162 Accordingly, courts must recognize the value of post-parodic 
imagery’s characteristic ambivalence—a state of mind that psychologists 
have described as a “structural feature of every image and fantasy,” which 
can be “therapeutic, imaginative, originating and joining” for both creator 
and wearer.163  
Of course, courts can only be as sensitive to these delicate social values 
as precedent will allow—and prevailing trademark doctrine would require 
that the post-parodist fit the square peg of his expressive project into the 
round hole of parody jurisprudence. Perhaps this is unsurprising, for 
“Western social thought . . . [has] over the centuries developed an almost 
institutionalized aversion toward dealing in analytically constructive ways 
with ambiguity.”164 But by imposing its simplistic, mechanical rules on 
post-parodists’ work, trademark law demands that fashion (and visual art, 
more generally) do something contrary to its very nature—that it “speak” 
with the precision of linguistic discourse.165 Putting words in the mouth of a 
parodist (as the Fourth Circuit arguably did in Haute Diggity Dog) is, at best, 
unproductive. Requiring an explicit, targeted, single-minded message from 
post-parodic works—as the Hyundai court essentially demanded of the 
parodist-defendant in that case—is the height of absurdity. 
In the coming years, courts will undoubtedly be confronted with disputes 
over post-parodies incorporating third-party trademarks, probably in the 
form of lawsuits brought by high-end fashion brands whose trademarks and 
trade dress are their most precious assets.166 Federal judges, as the de facto 
 
161 Dogan & Lemley, supra note 100, at 480-81. Professor Dreyfuss agrees, aptly describing 
our current state of affairs: 
In an economy in which consumers have immediate access to products and services 
everywhere on the globe, in a legal environment in which symbols are protected in 
multiple ways, in a culture in which trademarks constitute a significant medium of 
expression, freedom from all sources of confusion or dilution is simply not achievable. 
Dreyfuss, supra note 85, at 293. 
162 WUTHNOW ET AL., supra note 139, at 194. 
163 Garrison, supra note 92, at 229. 
164 DAVIS, supra note 42, at 5 n.2. 
165 Id. at 13 (“[W]hat most distinguishes clothing as a mode of communication from speech . . . 
is that . . . differences among clothing signifiers are not nearly as sharply drawn and standardized 
as are the spoken sounds employed in a speech community . . . .”). 
166 See Alexandria Symonds, Fashion Logo Parodies, Strictly Tongue in Chic, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
11, 2013, http:// www.nytimes.com/2013/12/12/fashion/fashion-logo-parodies-tshirts-strictly-tongue-
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stewards of trademark law, must avoid both the trap of pseudo-interpretation 
and the temptation to fall back on one-dimensional rules that ask the wrong 
questions of post-parodists and their works. Instead, courts should recognize 
that post-parodies represent an eminently “worthy” medium through which 
people can make sense of their complex relationships with branded goods—
objects that serve “not just to fill material needs, but to decipher our social 
surroundings, locate our social self, and transmit knowledge about who and 
what we are.”167 
In sum, post-parodists’ sensibility and creative output are new, different, 
and important. Unfortunately, current trademark doctrine cannot sensitively 
and sensibly determine the lawfulness of post-parodic goods. This Essay is 
not the place to craft the contours of more appropriate doctrinal framework,168 
but I hope the reader now understands my account of the emerging 
post-parodic sensibility and the reasons for its incompatibility with trademark 
law’s current parody doctrine. I cannot, of course, prove without a doubt 
that the fashion I have presented here embodies a new aesthetic, or that its 
spirit reflects the particular confluence of historical, economic, and psychological 
factors I have identified. Ultimately, the question is one of individual 
interpretation. And that is precisely the point. 
  
 
in-chic.html (discussing how, despite the rise of parodic clothing, “[s]ome brands are concerned 
their market value is being diluted by the existence of parody items” and may take legal action). 
167 WUTHNOW ET AL., supra note 139, at 116. See generally MARY DOUGLAS & BARON ISHER-
WOOD, THE WORLD OF GOODS: TOWARDS AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF CONSUMPTION xxiv 
(Routledge 2001) (1979) (“[G]oods are like flags. We ought to know how goods work as communi-
cators, or rather, since the goods are not active agents, only signals, we ought to know how they 
are used.”). 
168
 Should I revisit this topic in in the future, my proposed approach will likely be informed by 
(1) what I suspect to be an ultimately irreconcilable conflict between the post-parodic project and 
certain widely accepted, but misguided, assumptions about U.S. trademark law; and (2) the severe 
interpretive constraints of both judges and juries, at least in the realm of visual imagery. See 
Porter, supra note 155 (“[I]n the realm of the visual, where interpretation can seem largely or 
wholly organic, it is [easy to overlook] the unspoken arguments or narratives an image tells.”). 
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